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 The Northern Caucasus is one of the most volatile regions in the world.  Russia 
has fought two wars within it’s own republic in the last fifteen years in an attempt to 
stabilize Chechnya and keep the Northern Caucasus in the Russian Federation.  Certainly 
a lot of material has been written on how the Russian Federation’s actions have 
influenced and impacted this region, and have probably made the region less stable and 
more radicalized.  In my thesis I would like to investigate another area that I believe has a 
big impact on how the conflict has been fought, why it has unfolded the way it has, and 
prospects for returning stability to this region: the blood feuds of the traditional culture of 
the highlands in the Caucasus.  The paper will focus mainly on Chechnya, but it is almost 
impossible to investigate that area without also investigating Dagestan and Ingushetia. 
 
 First, some background must be established.  It will be necessary for the reader to 
know the history and collective memory of the region and how this contributes to 
nationalism.  In addition to this, I must also examination the beginning the conflict in 
Chechnya. Then an in-depth look into Chechen society and its traditional culture will be 
necessary.  This will focus on the clannish nature of the highlands society and the concept 
of honor, which contributes to the idea and practice of blood feuds.  The majority of the 
thesis will focus on how traditional culture, especially the presence of blood feuds, has 
escalated the conflict through mobilization, radicalization, and the politicization and 
Ideologization of violence. 
 
Obviously the Russian Federation’s answer to the conflict has not stopped the 
violence in the Northern Caucasus.  Although last year the second Chechen war was 
declared over, the region is still rife with violence including, but not limited to, terrorism.  
This paper will attempt to find a new solution to the Chechen problem by looking at the 
conflict from a different angle. 
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VOCABULARY 
ADAT: Customary law 
BEK/BEY: Turkish title for a chieftain, typically of smaller tribal groups 
GAR: Vainakh term for clan; a few extended families with blood ties 
GAZAVAT: Holy war 
IMAM: Muslim leader, often with authority over a given population 
MURID: Sufi adept; general term for a follower of Imam Shamil 
NAQSHBANDI: Sufi order prominent in the North Caucasus, especially Chechnya, in 
the first half of the 19th century 
NOKHCHO: Chechen 
NOKHCHALLA: The Chechen character, Chechen code of honor 
QADIRI: Sufi order prominent in the North Caucasus, especially Chechnya, in the 
second half of the 19th century 
SHARIA: Muslim law 
SHEIKH: Sufi leader, respected elder 
SUFI: Islamic mysticism  
TEIP: Vainakh for tribe; extended clan in Chechen society (teip and tribe are used 
interchangeably in this paper) 
TAR: Offshoot of a taip 
VAINAKH: Refers to the old tribes which are now the modern day Chechens and Ingush; 
it is also the only living branch of the Nakh languages 
YAH: The essence / honor of man 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Northern Caucasus is one of the most volatile regions in the world.  Russia 
has fought two wars within its own borders in the last fifteen years in an attempt to 
stabilize the region and keep its breakaway republic, Chechnya, in the Russian 
Federation.  These two wars, along with the notorious terrorist attacks originating from 
this region, have produced a multitude of material on how the Russian Federation and its 
security forces’ actions have impacted the crisis in the Northern Caucasus.  Contrarily, 
surprisingly little has been written on how Chechen culture itself has influenced the 
conflict and violence, specifically the traditional culture of the highlands and blood feuds.   
These ancient traditions and customs, which died out during the Middle Ages in many 
parts of the world, still survive and thrive today in the mountainous North Caucasus. 
 These traditions and customs still alive in Chechnya play a crucial part in the 
conflict, which have been overlooked by many, and will surely impact the solutions for 
peace and stability in the region.  In fact it is the culture of the highlands and the ancient 
practice of blood feuds that has intensified much of the violence in modern Chechnya and 
radicalized many in the population.  Examination into Chechen society will show that the 
continuation of traditional culture and ancient customs has played a major role in the 
conflict. The relative isolation of the mountainous North Caucasus from Russia due to 
geography, language, and culture made it difficult for the Russian regimes to first 
conquer and then successfully Russify the region. Thus, the traditional culture of 
Chechnya has persisted and thrived through the centuries. There are aspects of this 
culture that are revered, such as local hospitality and the concept of honor, which at times 
can promote peace and stability in the region. Even further, some of the customary laws 
found in traditional culture can be seen as appropriate for the administration of remote 
mountain villages, but others such as blood feud are detrimental.  The practice of blood 
feud through the years, or even generations, creates an escalation of violence even in 
times of relative peace in the North Caucasus. But couple the perpetuation of blood feuds 
with the Chechen conflicts of 1994 and 1999 and the violence escalates exponentially. 
To understand how these wars unfolded in certain ways and why Chechnya still 
remains an unstable and violent region, one must first delve into its past.  Chechnya’s 
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history and the development of the Chechen identity play an important role in modern 
Chechen life and how the people act and react against Russian forces.  As with any study 
of a separatist movement, an examination of the particular nationalism and its beginnings 
is necessary. But perhaps even more important than the nationalism that sprang up in 
Chechnya after the fall of the Soviet Union is the Chechen identity itself, which had been 
crafted and molded over the centuries.  In the case of Chechnya, nationalism led to two 
separate wars within as little as fifteen years, and at the core of these wars is the question 
of Chechen identity.  
 Much attention has been paid to how Islam impacted the wars and the 
radicalization of the Chechen separatist movement.  Indeed the Islamist movement had a 
great impact of the politicization and ideologization of violence in the Chechen separatist 
movement and both wars, but a too often overlooked contribution to the radicalization of 
violence is Chechen culture itself. The continued practice of blood feud in the North 
Caucasus in particular had a major impact on how the people of Chechnya, and 
neighboring Dagestan, view the conflict and Russian Federal forces. In the mentality of 
this traditional culture, the invasion of federal forces the ensuing acts of violence against 
the people of the highlands were acts that deserved and even required retaliation in the 
practice of the blood feud. Parallel to the modern war that raged between Russian troops 
and separatist rebels was an ancient kind of war: a war of vengeance and blood retaliation 
as set by the concept of honor and the code of blood feud in Chechen clannish society. 
 The violence of the blood feud runs parallel to the war and the actual violence of 
the war, and became more and more interwoven as the conflict escalated.  And over time 
even the concept of the blood feud became politicized and ideologized in Chechen 
society. Just as the Islamist movement became a mobilizing force for the separatist 
movement, so did the concept of the blood feud. In the end, the mentality that prevailed 
in many of the traditional villages of the highlands was that the Russian forces were now 
their sworn blood enemy and therefore deserved vengeance. Within Chechnya, blood 
feuds were also used to consolidate power and the legitimate use of force.  Looking at the 
Chechen conflict in this aspect changes the motives and consequences of the violence. 
Thus reshaping how people perceive and understand the conflict.  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PART I: INTRODUCTION TO THE 
SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF 
CHECHEN SOCIETY 
 
The North Caucasus is one of the most linguistically and ethnically diverse 
regions in the world. The 1989 Soviet census recognized 19 native national groups in the 
autonomous republics of the North Caucasus, although there are dozens more that live in 
the region. The Chechens, or Nokhchi as they call themselves, are the most numerous 
nationality of the North Caucasus, and the Russian Federal Republic of Chechnya is their 
traditional homeland with a population of approximately one million predominately 
Muslim people.1  The Caucasus mountain range and the isolation it brings is one of the 
major factors that has kept the region so diverse and allowed traditional culture and 
customs to thrive. These mountains even create a major distinction within Chechnya 
itself: that of the people in the lowlands, and the mountaineers of the highlands.  There is 
a vast divide between the cultures and attitudes of the mountaineers and their lowland 
counterparts. The Chechen people of the highlands have been historically more 
independent-minded and very hostile towards Russian rule and assimilation, while the 
people of the lowlands have been much less resistant.2 This study will focus primarily on 
the culture and traditions of the Chechen highlanders because it is the highlands where 
the Chechen separatist movement finds most of its rebels and support. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Goldenberg, pg. 3 
2 Youngs, pg. 7 
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CHAPTER 1: CLANNISH SOCIETY 
  
 The Chechen people are one of the oldest indigenous ethnic groups in the 
Caucasus. Central to the culture and customs of the highlands are the numerous clans of 
Chechen society.  Clans are the basic social structure of Chechnya and are the building 
blocks upon which all life in the highlands is created.  The clan and tribal systems of the 
North Caucasus can seem quite complex and confusing to the outside observer.  These 
systems can vary from society to society, and the formation of these tribes and clans was 
often a continuous process, where clan identity was capable of transformation.  We will 
now draw our focus on the structure of the Chechen clannish society of the highlands. 
  
Vainakh Teips 
The term Vainakh is used to represent the land, the language, and the peoples of 
the modern Chechen and Ingush republics.  These lands are ethnically homogeneous and 
the language they speak is derived from a common Nakh language.  The culture and 
many of the customs of the Chechen and Ingush peoples are very similar, thus falling into 
the category of Vainakh culture.  In fact, the Russians only divided the Vainakh people 
into Chechen and Ingush because their dialects were slightly different.3  In practical 
terms, when one is speaking of Chechen culture or Vainakh culture, it is one and the 
same.  In order to understand the importance of clans and blood kinship in Chechnya and 
how it influences all aspects of life, the basic structure of clannish society must be 
outlined. 
A few extended families closely related to one another formed a clan, or gar.  The 
blood kinship of these families is based on an actual common ancestor, whom they can 
all name.  It is several gars, which form a tribe, or teip. The members of a teip claim a 
blood relationship and also trace their roots back to a common ancestry, but unlike that in 
a clan, this relationship could be an actual blood kinship or merely putative.4    Clan 
membership and identity is the most important aspect of life in Vainakh society.  While                                                         
3 Zelkina, pg. 11 
4 Ibid., pg. 15 
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nearly class differentiates everywhere else in the world society, it is specific to Chechen 
society that people are rather differentiated by their region, or tukhums.5  A tukhum is a 
rural commune of several villages, several teips, which is the ultimate political entity 
among the Vainakh.  In the highlands of Chechnya, natural borders, such as rivers, 
canyons, slopes, and hollows, together define the communal borders linking mountain 
villages, or auls. In essence a tukhum is a union of teips, not always linked by blood or 
origins.  Rather they are a social structure of tribes that has formed over long periods of 
time. Nine tukhums form the Chechen nation.6 Within these tukhums the tribe, or teip, 
and its blood ties are still the most important aspect of one’s identity and is the basis for 
all economic and legal relationships.7  
 
The teips formed by the individual families of Chechen society vary in size where 
the number of members of a particular teip usually depends on antiquity. The oldest teips 
will be the largest ones and will also be the most respected within the larger community. 
Because of the age and size of these teips, many of the relationships are rather formal due 
to continuous migration.  The younger teips are usually smaller and are typically 
composed of people from one village who are mutually related.  These younger teips are 
generally created by single gars or even a single extended family that wishes to improve 
its own status by breaking away from their tribe to declare its own teip.  It is because of 
such practices that the number of teips in Chechnya has risen from thirty to around 150 
since the mid 19th century.8   
 
 For practical purposes, the teip serves as a broad collection of people with links to 
a particular village or district, meaning several extended families could be tied together 
into a single teip.  Imperial Russia found it hard to penetrate these self-ruling clans and 
this kind of pre-modern grouping of society did not diminish even during Soviet rule, but 
in fact was strengthened due to the importance of social networks during times of 
                                                        
5 Souleimanov, “Chechen Society and Mentality” 
6 “Chechen Ethnos,” www.chechnyafree.ru 
7 Zelkina, pg. 16 
8 Souleimanov, “Chechen Society and Mentality” 
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economic scarcity.9  The geography of the highlands has also contributed to the ability of 
clannish society to persist through the centuries and resist outside influence and change.  
The Caucasus Mountains serve as its own member in the society of the Chechen 
highlands. The isolated territory and rugged terrain has played a major role in the history 
and development of Chechen society, mainly the preservation of clannish society and 
traditional culture. 
 
While the importance of tribal identity has not been diminished over time, these 
teips are by no means static. In fact, the teip can be a very dynamic part of Chechen 
society. For example, when leaving a teip and resettling in a new area, clans could 
preserve their name and blood association or lose the sense of common identity.  In 
addition, tribes would be named after real or putative ancestors, or could bear the name of 
the most famous man in the tribe or a name of origin.10  Although in this way the clannish 
society of Chechnya is always changing, there are many aspects within clan life that do 
not change. The patriarchal nature and traditional culture of families, villages, and teips 
have persisted through the centuries.  Teips also come with very strong loyalties to 
members within the clan and neighboring clans, and with perhaps even stronger rivalries.  
  
Social Structure 
 At the lowest level of the clan hierarchy is the extended family, which includes up 
to thirty people (the head of the family, his wife, the families of their grown male 
children and grandchildren).  Historically all members of the extended family would 
share common property and have joint responsibilities. The head of the family would also 
regulate all economic activities, distribute jobs to the rest of the family members, give 
authorization for marriage.  In total he was responsible for the well-being and good 
behavior of the entire family.11  Chechnya remains an extremely patriarchal society 
where almost all decisions are made by the head of the family. 
 
                                                        
9 King, pp. 202-3 
10 Zelkina, pg. 15 
11 Ibid., pg. 14 
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 Within the teips it is the clan elders who establish the moral codes and make 
decisions affecting the entire clan. Each clan has it’s own supreme body, the council of 
elders.  The council is typically constituted by the oldest and most respected teip 
members.  The decisions made by the elders that affect the entire clan are declarations of 
war, establishing the harvest time, and similar affairs.12  Of course the elders’ power 
within the teip was far from absolute, and greatly relied on the strength of the concept of 
honor in Chechen society.  It is this that reinforces the mutual respect and adherence to 
the moral code between the elders and individual families and among every teip member.   
 
 Interestingly, when the head of a family dies, power does not directly transfer to 
the eldest son, but rather to the most capable and respected male member.13  As Berzhe 
observed in 1859 Chechnya, the authority of the father is all-powerful until his sons reach 
weapon-wielding age, at which point the relationship between “father and children is 
shaped by the rights of the stronger.”14 This again shows the importance of the concept of 
honor and the impact strength and bravery have on the morals codes in Vainakh society.  
While the head of the family is truly the absolute ruler of his family, he must still abide 
by certain codes of conduct as set by the teip and ensure the rest of his family does the 
same.  The members of a tribe share common responsibility for the tribe, and also enjoy 
the protection of the tribe.  This kind of mutual responsibility is meant to ensure strict 
adherence to all regulations imposed by the clan and tribal authorities. Historically this 
basic moral code was as follows: first, there is an obligation of each member to follow 
the principles laid down by the tribe; second, there is a right to an equal share in the 
communal land-holding; third, the declaration by the entire tribe of blood revenge on 
another clan for the killing or humiliation of one of its members; fourth, supplying 
assistance to a family in need; fifth, unconditional implementation of the tribal 
regulations of the social and moral code; and last, absolute adherence to the decisions 
made by the tribe’s elders.15   
                                                         
12 Souleimanov, “Chechen Society and Mentality” 
13 Zelkina, pg. 14 
14 Jersild, pg. 69 
15 Zelkina, pg. 16 
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 Chechen teips are essentially nations within a nation. Each teip has it’s own moral 
codes and it is of the upmost importance that members that support one another.16  No 
hereditary dynasties have ever been formed among the Vainakh people.17  Throughout 
their history the Chechens had neither a state of their own nor a kind of any kind. This 
further reinforces the importance of teip.  Throughout the centuries the Chechens, 
especially those of the highlands, have resisted foreign rule, often using that 
indestructible member of its society, the mountains, as refuge from foreign invaders.18 
Even when the Chechen lands did fall under foreign rule, outside powers had no actual 
power in the highlands, which remained self-governing through clan rule. 
   
Ethos of teip 
“The norm of Vainakh ethics is the code of wise  
truths of people that reflect their ideals.” 
- Edi Isaev 
 
 Each teip had an obligatory ethos and the higher the social standing of a man 
within that teip, and then the more fervently he was to adhere to that ethos.19 While the 
adherence to the morals codes of old are not as strictly enforced today, the same basic 
characteristics of the teip are still the driving force of the moral code for every family.  
These codes of honor are meant to reflect the ideals of the Chechen people.  Respect for 
one’s elders is still of the utmost importance in Vainakh society, and it is said that every 
Chechen family, without exception, respects and cares for the elder generations.  There is 
also a mutual responsibility that is felt between the generations. The old and the young 
feel the need to look after one another and share responsibility.  In many cases the parents 
will continue living with one or more of their adult sons and their families, and if not, 
they will most likely live in a small house built for them by their sons, right by the wall of 
their sons’ house.20                                                           
16 Souleimanov, “Chechen Society and Mentality” 
17 Zelkina, pg. 19 
18 Souleimanov, “Chechen Society and Mentality” 
19 Isaev 
20 “Inside the Family,” www.waynakh.com 
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 The collective spirit of the Vainakh teip also still echoes in modern day 
Chechnya. The members of clans and tribes still feel an obligation to help those in need 
and live through mutual assistance. But it does not stop at basic and economic needs. The 
family shares in everything, the achievements and shortcomings of one man will be felt 
by the entire extended family.  A dishonor by one family member brings shame upon the 
entire extended family; their faces “will darken,” and the entire family will live with 
bowed heads. And on the other hand, if someone has done well, people will say, “nothing 
else could be expected from a member of that fine family,” or “the son a such a father 
could not behave in a different way.”21  This kind of family honor represents how others 
see the family and the teip as a whole. Honor is the most important aspect of Chechen 
society.  In order to create and sustain a family’s honor a certain sense of competition is 
needed. 
 
 Vainakh teips also encourage a healthy competitive culture; with other teips and 
also within the tribe itself.  Many family traditions are competition oriented.  It is 
expected that each child should be, and want to be, yah, or better than everyone else22. 
Yah is seen to be the main virtue of the Chechen character. It is the driving force of every 
Chechen man.23 The elders believe there should be no circumstances where their child is 
worse than its playmates. The elders also believe that while a child could be competitive, 
he should also protect those children that are weaker, and never be the first to start a 
fight.24  Of course, competition in teip society goes beyond that of childish games.  There 
has been a continuous spirit of competition between teips, which can lead to serious 
tensions and fluctuations of the social standing of particular teips. Clans are often trying 
to prove themselves worthy of their social status through displays of courage. Alongside 
family honor, this idea of the fearless hero is engrained in Vainakh society as the highest 
character. Memories of past defeats of the battle can greatly diminish the standing of teip, 
or success raids on neighboring tribes can boost the reverence others feel for that teip.25                                                           
21 “Inside the Family,” www.waynakh.com 
22 Ibid. 
23 Isaev 
24 “Inside the Family,” www.waynakh.com 
25 Souleimanov, “Chechen Society and Mentality” 
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 Respect for elders, mutual assistance, and chivalry are the principles that most 
appear in everyday life of Chechen society. These stem directly from the ethos of a teip. 
Violators of these virtues of the Vainakh teip were, and still today, condemned by their 
fellow members of the teip.  Regardless of one’s standing within the teip, to go against 
the ethos of the tribe would bring shame and denunciation upon oneself and family.26 
This concept of honor is so central to the Chechen character and mentality that it has 
enabled the continuation of traditional society and old customs that are still present in 
modern highland culture. 
 
Adat, Traditions, and Customs 
 
“The teip is the fortress of adat.”  
- Chechen Proverb  
 
 Adat is the customary law of the Caucasus, or the local codes of conduct.  This 
customary law is the set of rules for daily life in the clan and family units; a code of 
conduct that is a compilation of all the moral norms and traditions of Vainakh society that 
brings together all different aspects of communal life.   Adat is passed down through the 
centuries, and while some aspects may change and evolve over time, the basic moral 
codes have remained.27  Adat in Chechnya set laws for self-help within teips, but most 
importantly was the obligation to gain and sustain respect and honor in the eyes of the 
general public.28  Berzhe described adat as a unique feature of the Chechen ethnic 
identity, held onto by the Chechens throughout the years as a way to free themselves 
from foreign domination.  He saw adat as indigenous to the region and the genuine 
custom of the people, which was the basis for the formation of social life and 
enforcement of social norms in lieu of a firm and stable state.29  The strong sense of 
honor in adat is what paves the way for blood feud and sworn kinship, ancient features of 
customary law that are still in practice today.  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 The unwritten rules of the Chechen clans, and much of the North Caucasus, have 
survived the centuries due to several factors.  The mountainous terrain has kept many of 
the peoples of the North Caucasus isolated from their surrounding civilizations and 
modern progress.  Throughout history the Caucasus have not only been the merging point 
of two worlds, but also the dividing line between dynasties and empires.30  This has made 
the region notoriously hard to conquer and control, thus leaving many of the clans and 
tribes resistant to outside rule and out of reach of foreign influence, especially in the 
highlands.  The introduction of Islam to the region did not have much of an impact on 
adat as the Chechens remained opposed to sharia law, which was alien to Vainakh 
customs.  Instead adat thrived in the land instead of Muslim law, which was seen as an 
encroachment upon patriarchal Chechen society.31 When Imperial Russia could finally 
claim victory over Chechnya in 1859, the majority of the clans and tribes of the highlands 
were still self-governing.  Many Russian officials at that time warned that the 
introduction of Russian courts in the region would be dangerous. It was felt that Russian 
forms of administration would provoke “at first discontent and then straightforward 
rebellion.”32  In fact, instead of Russifying the Chechens, Imperial officials sought to 
codify adat and transform “fluid cultural and legal ideas and relationships into 
reproducible rules.”33  It was this kind of policy from Russia that helped to preserve the 
ancient customary laws and perpetuates them into the 20th and even 21st centuries. 
 
 The absence of traditional states in the North Caucasus and the inability of foreign 
rulers to govern locally, especially in the inaccessible mountains, left all responsibility of 
law and governance up to the tribes and individual clans.  The preservation of the 
Vainakh teip and clannish society in Chechnya has enabled the preservations of adat and 
its supervision by the tribe. Even without the presence of a formal state, the Caucasian 
mountain societies were able to establish and keep these clearly defined codes of 
standards and rules that prevented chaos in the anarchic nature of the absence of a 
governing state.  This was one of the advantages of the blood feud: while harsh, it was an  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imperative means for preventing anarchy, chaos, and despotism.34 
 
 Today many Chechens believe that adat is there to “elevate man, help him 
become better.”35  It is within adat where one finds chivalry, hospitality, respect for 
elders, and the concept of honor.  While adat in modern Chechnya stems from very old 
customary law, it is important to distinguish between adat and the rules of pagan law, 
lamkerst, which is still practiced in some parts of Chechnya, but rejected by most.  The 
influence of the more severe lamkerst in society is negligible. Followers of adat feel that 
those who practice pagan law feel free to steal, show off, use force, and may kidnap, rape 
or even kill a girl.  Adat forbids Chechens to harm small children, women and elderly 
people and excluded them from blood feuds. Adat demands that a man keep order where 
he lives, in his private home and public, the village square.  Adat would also dictate that 
if a man kidnaps a girl with the purpose of marriage, but she loves another, then the 
kidnapper would then be turned into matchmaker.36  This is how Chechen ethnographer 
Said-Magomed Khasiyev describes the present and future of adat. He sees the respect of 
adat as the path to the revival of public morality. “There will be no revival until everyone 
learns to ask themselves what good deeds they have done today. Chechens used to 
believe that every day man I given nine chances to do good and nine chances to go 
wrong. Tread not on a bug, keep from saying bad words, throw evil thoughts out of your 
head. This way you will learn to do good. This is a way to high standards of public 
morality.”37 
 
 The Chechen mentality is quite different from what is expected in much of the 
Western world. Teip and adat have endured through the centuries in Chechnya and with 
them traditional culture. As was mentioned earlier, this is quite a distinction between the 
Chechens of the highlands, and those of the lowlands. For obvious reasons, lowland 
Chechens are fairly more Europeanized and tolerant of outside views and more tolerant in 
general.  The mountaineers are much more rooted in traditional notions of honor and  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dignity.38 These two mentalities can often clash when culture gets lost in translation. 
There is a particular mountain etiquette of the Chechen highlands that calls for strict and 
precise adherence. This code of conduct is referred to as nokhchalla.  This code is a 
complex set of rules and standards of behavior, that if not followed could have fatal 
consequences.39  Nokhchalla also refers to the Chechen character itself. Of course, central 
to this character is honor. Chivalry, gentility, diplomacy, masculinity, generosity, and 
reliability are the qualities a man of a devout Chechen family must possess.40  This code 
of conduct and ethics has regulated Chechen society for centuries, and while it has 
evolved and been updated over time, its roots are still firmly placed in the ancient world. 
The surviving version of nokhchalla is that of the common man, which all good 
Chechens obey with their own free will or from fear of being ostracized by the teip.41  
Etiquette requires that one should carefully weigh his words, facial expressions, and 
gestures.  This applies when talking about another person or his relatives, especially 
female relatives.  Especially harsh or obscene words are unthinkable.  It is also not 
appropriate to get drunk, spit, or mishandle the property of others.  Spitting upon meeting 
another person, unsheathing a dagger during a dispute or disrespectfully handling another 
man’s hat are all the equivalent of a slap in the face and also considered blood offenses.42 
  
 There are other attributes of the Chechen character that contribute to the creation, 
evolution, and survival of adat, traditional culture, and Vainakh society.  The most 
important is the concept of honor, which is understand in a very broad sense. It is from 
this strong concept of honor that all of the other Chechen characteristics spring.  A man is 
expected to keep his word, support his family materially and spiritually so that the entire 
family can lead a dignified life.  Chechen honor requires faithful friendship, but also 
strong independence.43 The honor found in fierce independence and freedom has driven 
the Chechen people for centuries.  Vainakh honor also supports courage, fearlessness, 
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hospitality, honesty, and purity of women. 
 
 All of the societies of the Caucasus are known for their courage and bravery, but 
it is the Chechens who are always considered the boldest.44  Deeply implanted in the 
Chechen psyche is the importance of honor, and the best way to come of this psyche is 
through bravery. There is a very strong hero culture in Chechen society, especially 
among the mountaineers.  Bravery is held in such high regard that Chechens seem to have 
a significantly diminished instinct of self-preservation, and instead an instinct of 
irrational courage.45  Their highly developed sense of human dignity and fear of shame is 
such that a Chechen would gladly lay down his life in the name of bravery, dignity and 
shamelessness.  
 
 The drive to obey adat and serve as good members of Chechen society is not 
derived from a fear of punishment by some central authority, but rather by the fear of 
dishonoring the family and teip.  Social standing in the eyes of one’s own community and 
other teips is of the utmost importance.  There is also the fear of retribution from 
neighboring teips where there has been a transgression against the adat of the land. 
Conversely, while bravery is so revered in Vainakh society, the fear of shame can also 
have a stifling effect on a man, diminishing his boldness. 
 
 Truly it is the teip that is the keeper of adat and traditional Vainakh culture in 
Chechen society.    Ancient customs and traditions that died out in the middle ages in the 
Western world, such as blood feud, are alive and well in the mountains of Chechnya.  
The clannish structure has endured for centuries and enabled the ancient customs of the 
Vainakh people to continue into the modern era. Isolated from the progress of the outside 
world, teips and tukhums in the Chechen highlands have governed themselves using 
nokhchalla has their code of conduct, emphasizing the concept of honor, through 
mechanisms such as blood feud.  
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPT OF HONOR 
 
 As described earlier, central to the clannish culture of the Chechen highlands is 
the concept honor, especially among men.  The honor a man holds in his family and in 
his society is worth life and death, even in Chechnya today.  The honor of women is also 
extremely vital to the clan and is measured by purity and fidelity.  These ancient ways 
have continued almost unchanging through the centuries and thrive in the volatile and 
violent highlands of the Northern Caucasus, even against the backdrop of a modern 
world. Freedom and honor remain the highest values of the mountaineers of Chechnya. A 
deeper examination of how the Chechens understand honor will provide context and a 
better understanding of how the blood feud works in the highlands and how it has 
survived into the 21st century. 
  
Nokhchalla 
 The best way to understand Chechen honor is to understand the Chechen 
character, or nokhchalla.  Nokhcho is the Vainakh word for Chechen, and nokhchalla 
brings together all the specific characteristics of what makes a good Chechen man.46  It is 
the code of conduct and the system of ethics that regulates Chechen society and defines 
the norms of personal and social behavior.47  This can also be described as the Chechen 
code of honor, or a condensed formula of the Chechen way of life.  By this code it is 
chivalry, gentility, diplomacy, manliness, generosity, and reliability that makes a good 
Chechen man.  When it comes to reality, it is important to remember that nokhchalla is 
the sheer ideal of how a Chechen man should be, not necessarily how he truly is. These 
are simply the characteristics and virtues that are most revered among the mountaineers.  
While the highlands have remained fairly resistant to progressive influence, it is 
increasingly difficult for the Chechen man to adhere to this code of conduct in an 
increasingly modern world. 
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 The surviving code of ethics in Chechnya today is that of the commoners of the 
feudal era, which is now universally applicable, although there are some local variations 
among teips.  The teips of Chechnya are very tight-knit communities and do have to 
anonymity of modern society that those in the Western world enjoy today.  This 
closeness of society creates a fear of infamy and of dishonoring one’s family among the 
tribe.  Along with a man’s free will, it is this aspect of society that also forces him to 
obey the code of conduct. Although the Chechens are strictly bound to their moral code 
and others usually meet behavior against it with true bewilderment, disputes are 
inevitable.  For this purpose there are special councils to help work out the kinks in 
Vainakh society.48 
 
 A true Chechen man is a diplomat in all maters. He should have the ability to deal 
with people without showing his privileged position and should be very polite and 
accommodating so as to not hurt anyone of lesser standing.  For example, if a man is 
riding on horseback and meets another man walking, the man on horseback shall be the 
first to make greetings. But if the man walking is older, the rider should dismount his 
horse to greet his elder.  Politeness, willingness to compromise, and helping and 
supporting each other are all very nokhchalla characteristics.  There have been neither 
princes nor serfs among the Chechen people, so maintaining equality in society is a great 
virtue.  Nokhchalla also puts great importance on friendship. A true Chechen friendship 
should last a lifetime: in joy and in sorrow. The highlanders hold friendship as a sacred 
institution.  Thoughtlessness or impoliteness could be forgiven if shown to a brother, but 
to a friend — never!49 
 
 Hospitality is another sacred institution to the Chechens. The auls of the 
mountains are still run in very communal ways where mutual aid and assistance among 
Chechen brothers is common.  The harsh conditions of mountain living have made it 
imperative for Chechens to work together and help each other. Should the head of a 
family die; the entire aul would feel responsible for the grieving family. If it happened  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that an elderly villager was doing some kind of work, his neighbors are expected help 
him and more often than not, it is the neighbors who will finish the job.50 This custom 
goes back centuries and continues today. This part of the Chechen character also extends 
to guests.  During a Chechen uprising in 1877, an entire aul was burnt to the ground and 
most of the villagers slaughtered because they refused to turn over a rebellion leader, 
their guest, to the Russians.  The village elders’ response, “General! You can ask from 
the people anything that is possible. You surely know how hard it would be for us to part 
with the graves of our fathers and our native soil. Nevertheless, we cannot surrender 
Umma to you. Umma is our guest.”51  No matter how humble, any Chechen without a 
moment’s hesitation should open the door to any other Chechen, no matter how 
influential or high-ranking. Solicitation, adulation, begging and humiliation are not 
Chechen words.52  Hospitality is so highly regarded in Vainakh society that a Chechen 
would even offer shelter to his enemy. It is the honorable thing to do. 
 
 Nokhchalla not only embodies general virtues, but also encourages the specific 
ways a man should act.  The head of the family, husbands, and fathers should taciturn and 
thoughtful.  A good Chechen man should always think well before he acts, or pronounces 
judgment on a neighbor.  Restraint is also revered in the Chechen man. A “lack of self 
control exhibits foolishness, patience demonstrates good manners.”53  In all 
circumstances the utmost restraint should be used, also in speech. The use of unprintable 
words, especially about a woman, is most revolting to the Chechens.  This sheds light on 
one the particularly important aspects of what it is to be a good Chechen: a woman with 
loose morals is the biggest disgrace that can befall a Chechen family. Some such women 
have even been lynched in the Chechen Republic for their actions.54 
 
 The boldness of Chechen courage would seen contradictory to the restraint that is 
also expected from Chechen men, but in fact having nokhchalla is attaining a balance  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between these two virtues that rule the highlands. Great valor is one of the most respected 
traits of a Chechen man.  One of the most respected tukhums in Chechnya was so because 
“its members according to family tradition had a reputation of fearless heroes; such a 
person could not be born or live among them, who would have the slightest room for 
even the slightest sense of fear in his heart.”55  Nokhchalla rules out any and all attempts 
at subjugation.  The spirit of freedom and readiness to fight is essential to the Chechen 
moral code.  Chechen boys, since time immemorial, have been brought up to be 
disciplined freedom fighters — protectors who are trained to bear arms.56 One who is 
always ready for self-sacrifice.  Freedom and independence are synonymous with life for 
the Chechens. The oldest surviving Chechen greeting translated literally as “come again 
free.”57 While valor on the battlefield is essential, so is honor.  The story goes that when 
Imam Shamil finally surrendered to the Russians in 1859, one of his comrades-in-arms 
hailed him several times, but he never turned around. When asked later why he did not 
turn around to respond, Shamil explained that he would have been killed if he had. “We 
Chechens never shoot a man in the back.”58 
 
 Chechen songs, fables, and epics often end with the phrase, “May no mother ever 
give birth to a son without yah!”  Yah is seen as the main virtue in man. A man with yah 
wholly embraces fortitude, valor, courage and bravery, but is not slave to these virtues.59  
A man with yah is a man that fully embodies nokhchalla.  Of course a good Chechen man 
will strive to exemplify all the characteristics of nokhchalla to be a better man, but 
perhaps more importantly to gain the respect of his family and teip.  “Whenever you hear 
that a person has no yah, this means the person in question commands no respect within 
his or her circle.  Describing a man as having no yah is a good as saying he is no man at 
all. Stating that a man possesses yah is the highest possible praise to that man. A man 
with yah in him is a model to emulate. He possesses all the qualities that the Vainakhs 
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deem positive in their ethical code.”60 
 
 While having yah calls for a man to be strong and courageous, it also calls for a 
man to be modest, temperate, generous, and responsive to the needs of others. To gain the 
respect of others a man should also show the best results in labor, battle, and sport.  The 
Vainakh family code insists that parents instill these competitive qualities in children.  
Teacher of Vainakh folklore Adam Dolatov best explains the importance of respect of 
yah in Chechen society: “Gain the deepest possible insight into yourself and your 
ancestry. Retain your yah. Never lose decency or dignity. You are mortal, but never be 
fearful of your physical death. The only thing to be really feared is life without decency, 
dignity, spirit, faith, or yah. He who loses them loses his freedom as well.”61  Indeed, in 
the Chechen highlands and man without yah is no man at all. 
 
Sworn Brotherhood 
 “Liberty, equality, and brotherhood of men form the basic nucleus of Chechen 
society.”62   The Chechens fierce love for freedom has been well documented throughout 
the ages. From Shamil and his freedom fighters of the mid 19th century to the separatists 
after the fall of communism the Chechens have ferociously fought for freedom and the 
right to be independent in their own lands.  As intense as the Chechens are about 
independence, it is with the same intensity that they approach friendship. The sworn 
brotherhood of the Vainakh raises friendship to its highest peak. As one proverb goes, “a 
worthy man always has friends.”63 Just as a man is measured by the respect he carries in 
the community, he is also measured by the friends he keeps and the way he treats his 
friends. It has already been said that inattentiveness and discourtesy towards an actual 
brother can be pardoned, but never towards a friend. It is this ethic of sworn brotherhood 
that has long been considered the foundation of relations between the Chechen people.64  
Undoubtedly, sworn brotherhood shows the true honor of a Chechen man.  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 To the Chechens, sworn brotherhood is a very special occasion. The ritual is 
performed in front of the relations and friends of both sides.  There are three kinds of 
brotherhood. The first brotherhood is one solemnly sworn before friends and the elders.  
The second is sworn by the drinking of milk from a single cup with a gold ring so as not 
the rust the friendship symbolizing faithfulness.  The third brotherhood is sworn by the 
mixing of blood.  The two men cut their fingers to mix drops of blood, making them as 
close as brothers as possible. After the ritual, the sworn brothers exchange items, such as 
felt cloaks, that symbolize the sworn brotherhood.  Lev Tolstoy was famously friendly 
with many highlanders and described them as his sworn brothers. He wrote the following 
about Sado Miserbiev: “He proved his faithfulness risking his life, but this was of no 
importance for him. It was a custom and pleasure for him” Miserbiev even gave Tolstoy a 
sword as a symbol of true friendship.65  Perhaps it is even the sworn brotherhood where 
the Chechen displays the most honor; the honor of a friend being more important than 
one’s own life. 
  
Honor of Women 
 It is important to highlight the role women play in the Chechen concept of honor, 
not just because a woman’s purity is so highly valued, but also because women are often 
at the center of mountaineer conflicts.  Many times women are the victims of crimes in 
the highlands. Gender and sexuality are still problematic aspects of Vainakh culture66 and 
can often lead to blood feud.  Indeed life in the highlands was, and still is, especially 
harsh for women.  The treatment of women in Chechnya is quite backwards, by Western 
standards.  In the 19th century a woman in Chechnya often faced the prospect of 
kidnapping and rape if she dared to decline a marriage proposal and this practice still 
persists to this day. In one documented case, her relatives even participated in such a rape 
because they supported the family marriage alliance.67  At times kidnap and rape is used 
to persuade the victim to marry the perpetrator, because of the utmost importance is that a 
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woman remains pure.  As was stated previously, a woman with loose morals will bring 
the greatest shame on her family.  An impure woman has absolutely no prospects for 
marriage in the highlands, even if it is the product of rape.   Old tradition even stipulated 
that a woman’s screams would have to be heard in order for her to lodge a complaint of 
rape.  Further still, “women who are well known for their debauched behavior are not 
allowed to charge someone with rape.”  On the other hand, historical custom justifies the 
murder of a perpetrator of rape by the victim’s family.68  Not surprisingly, this often leads 
to blood feuds between families.  Thus the cycle of violence in the Chechen highlands is 
often centered on women.  And fittingly enough, no one but a woman can break off a 
blood feud. 
 
 While Chechen women live in a fiercely patriarchal society that can have fatal 
outcomes for those women who do not obey the female moral standards, there is special 
attention paid to how a good Chechen man should treat a good Chechen woman.  A true 
Chechen holds each woman for a saint.69  Chechen mothers in particular enjoy special 
social status.  From time immemorial it is the woman of the family who has kept the fire; 
and the Chechens have always held in the highest esteem those who keep the fire — it is 
a privileged position.  In fact, one of the worst things a Chechen could say to another is, 
“I wish the fire went dead in your fireplace.”70  While indeed Vainakh society is very 
patriarchal, this shows the respect that is also shown for maternal virtues. 
 
 In order to maintain virtue, contact between men and women not of the same 
family is extremely limited.  One anecdote perfectly displays how fragile is the honor of a 
woman and the great lengths a virtuous man would go to preserve it. A Chechen man 
asked for overnight shelter in a village house. He would never have gone to that 
particular house had known there was no one but a young woman inside.  The woman, 
being a hospitable Chechen, gave him a meal and then guarded his sleep by sitting awake 
all night in the front room. It was not until morning that the man was aware of this. And 
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while washing, he accidentally toughed her hand with his little finger. In an extreme 
display of chivalry, he cut off the finger with his dagger before leaving the house.71  Only 
a man brought up in the true spirit of nokhchalla would go to such pains to protect a 
woman’s honor. 
 
 It is Chechen honor that lies at the center of the tradition of blood feud. A man’s 
honor and respect from the community are his greatest virtues. Along with a man’s honor 
and respect, Chechens also hold the respect and honor of their women in the highest 
regard. If either of these feels threatened, a man of true Chechen character will turn to 
violence to protect the honor of himself and his family as well as to gain and keep 
respect.  Thus a cycle of violence in perpetuated in Chechnya through the mechanism of 
the blood feud in the traditional culture of teip society. 
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CHAPTER 3: BLOOD FEUD 
 
 The blood feud is an ancient Vainakh custom that has survived into the modern 
world.  A tradition that was once found in all parts of the world but faded away with the 
demise of the feudal system and the rise centralized states.  This did not happen in the 
highlands of Chechnya. Along with other traditional customs, the blood feud has endured 
in traditional Chechen culture.  And today, the Chechen highlands have become quite 
infamous for this medieval practice.  The persistence of blood feuds in Chechnya gives 
great insight into the Chechen mentality and why conflict and the cycle of violence has 
continued there, almost unabated, since the fall of the Soviet Union.  In a society where 
honor, a fierce passion for freedom, and the principle of collective responsibility are 
highly revered combines with the practice of blood feud combine in an unstable 
environment, the outcome is especially deadly. 
 
Ancient Custom 
 
 “When shall blood cease to flow in the mountains? 
When sugar cane grows in the snow.” 
- Chechen Proverb 
 
 Blood feuds have been waged in Chechnya for centuries according to the ancient 
laws of adat.  While this practice along with the proscribed set of cultural traditions can 
be used as a deterrent to help mitigate Chechen-on-Chechen violence and preserve the 
Chechen culture and population,72 blood feuds can also become devastating.  The 
emphasis on collective responsibility in Vainakh culture means there is imposed shared 
responsibility for any misdeed on entire families, clans, or tribes, and in some cases entire 
tukhums.  Long lasting blood feuds involving whole teips can lead to the mutual 
extermination of entire male populations.73  The strength of the concept of honor and the 
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fear of shame have kept this ancient custom alive in the highlands. 
 
 The historical absence of a stable state structure in Chechnya has played a major 
role in the persistence of the widespread and destructive mountain tradition of blood 
feud.74 With no central state to regulate and enforce laws, it is left up to the teips. The 
lack of central authority left the blood feud as the major restraining factor in disputes 
between clans, if those involved were wise enough to avoid going to such extremes as 
blood feud.  It was the clan elders who oversaw the blood feuds and helped to reconcile 
the feuding parties.75  While blood feud is notoriously harsh and vicious, traditionally 
adat did forbid children, women, and the elderly to be harmed in a blood feud76.  In this 
absence of the traditional state, clannish society was able to thrive, and along side it its 
ancestral culture, adat, and blood feud.  
 
 The teip is the most important part of Chechen identity and the collective nature 
of teip society means that an offense on one man is an offense to the entire clan.  It is 
then a matter of clan honor to avenge this offense in the appropriate manner.  A blood 
feud is generally declared by the men of a family; and if the offense is great enough, the 
men of the entire clan.  Blood feud formally extends to all male relative of the offender, 
usually only his father, his sons, and particularly his brothers.  In some cases, a blood 
feud can span centuries.77  Causes for blood feud include, the taking of land, serious 
injury, murder (intended or accidental, the Vainakh make no distinction),78 or serious 
insult.  One of the greatest dishonors is that of a woman or a girl.  In this case blood feud 
is usually declared by the entire clan and aimed against all of the men of the clan that 
caused the insult.79  In such a situation it is the honor of the entire clan that is now on the 
line. 
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 The manner of the highland blood feud ritual is compelling.  When a person is 
killed, harmed, or otherwise insulted in a dispute and the offender is known and the facts 
against him, then the members of a neutral teip will go to the offending family to 
announce that a blood feud has been declared.  Feuding parties are forbidden to live in 
the same village; when a blood feud has been declared, the offender and his entire family 
are given a certain amount of time in which they must move away.  There have been 
cases where families have moved away, selling all their homes and possessions at rock-
bottom prices, and left not just the village, but the whole of Chechnya.  All of this done is 
fear of retribution.80 
 
 Originally a person would take his revenge solely on the person responsible for 
the deviant act.  But over time this rule evolved and at times one would take revenge on 
one or more of the offender’s male relatives, usually a brother.  This choice was up to the 
mistreated family.  For instance, if the offender was not well respected within the 
community, then the decision might be made to kill his brother who was well-liked and 
respected, thus even further punishing his family.81  The killing of multiple male relatives 
also re-illustrates the importance of collective responsibility in highland society.  Making 
a Chechen man truly his brother’s keeper.  It was also possible for a wronged family to 
accept blood money instead of declaring a feud upon the offending family. But often in 
the eyes of the community, accepting such blood money would bring dishonor and 
humiliation upon that wronged family.82  There was no honor in accepting money as 
retribution for murder, but great honor in declaring vengeance for a slain clan member. 
 
 In the same way that the fear of shame drives a Chechen mountaineer to adhere to 
a nokhchalla life, it is the same fear that can also drive a man to declare a blood feud.  If 
offense or humiliation has been laid upon a family, then many times the only appropriate 
course to pursue is that of the blood feud.  Adat prescribes for blood feud under certain 
circumstances, and if a man does not follow through he will bring even more shame and 
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dishonor upon and family and perhaps entire clan.  A man’s standing in society depends 
on his ability to avenge his family and his honor.  But this does not come from a wild 
thirst for vengeance, but rather, as Leontiy Lyulye described in the 19th century: “Among 
the mountain people the blood feud is not an uncontrollable permanent feeling such as the 
vendetta is among the Corsicans. It is more like an obligation imposed by the public 
opinion.”83  In theory, once vengeance has been carried out and a blood feud satisfied and 
reconciled, the clans should be able to move forward.  But this is not always the case in 
actuality, there are times when neither side is willing to yield and a feud can spiral out of 
control. 
 
 When it has been decided that a blood feud should be reconciled, an entirely new 
ritual must take place.  On a designated day, several hundred relatives and villagers of the 
offender, all in black with covered heads, gather outside the village of the victim.84  
Depending upon the size of the village, sometimes thousands of people may gather for a 
reconciliation ceremony.  The offender and his relatives come to plead for forgiveness 
and wear cloaks covering their faces because they are not allowed to look at many 
member of the injured clan.  The closest relative of the victim the publicly shaves the 
head and beard of his blood foe, signifying that he has been forgiven.  The genesis of this 
particular custom is unknown, but many believe that if a man can resist the temptation to 
slit his enemy’s throat while shaving him, then he must have truly forgiven him.85 
 
 Imperial Russia tried to regulate and limit the blood feud because the regime 
feared the perpetuation of several different and potentially interminable feuds.  Blood 
feud was declared illegal by decree in 1859, but the tradition remained in tact because it 
was so deeply woven in the fabric of highland society.  The tradition of the blood feud 
long predates any Russian rule and represented a shadow government, providing justice 
and resolving disputes according to the terms and traditions of teip society, out of reach 
of Imperial officials.  It even happened that the family of a murder victim would hide the 
body so they could then enact their own revenge according to the terms of the blood  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feud.86   Tsarist Russia and Soviet Russia both tried to suppress the tradition of blood 
feuds, but to no avail as the practice continued throughout the secluded Chechen 
Mountains. 
 
 There is no time limitation for how long a blood feud might last.  In the previous 
centuries, some feuds were known to have lasted hundreds of years.  Thankfully today, 
many of the outstanding blood feuds are being reconciled and canceled, due in large part 
to the efforts of neutral teips.  But this is not always the case.  When the harsh realties of 
war collide with the hot tempers of the land and the modern world, many current blood 
feuds have run out of control. When neither side is willing to yield, dozens can end up 
dead. 
 
Modern Feuds 
 Since the fall of the Soviet Union, blood feuds in Chechnya have been on the rise.  
In fact, there has been a sharp increase due to the two wars Chechnya has been over the 
past twenty years.  A society at war is the perfect environment for the blood feud to 
thrive: it is that much easier to find the offender and exact revenge.87  War has hardened 
the Chechen people; many are now less likely to forgive those who have wronged them 
and more likely to seek revenge for those loved ones they have lost.  Traditional acts of 
blood revenge continue in the mountains, but some blood feuds have been taken into the 
21st century. 
 
 While blood feuds continue in Chechnya in the their traditional manner, as a 
result of a murder, injury, or insult, a special commission for reconciliation of families in 
the state of blood feud was created in August 2010.  One special commission source 
stated, “Within less than three weeks, it managed to consider and settle 18 such cases.  It 
is a very good result, especially if we remember that reconciliation of feudists is a very 
hard task. In some cases the blood feud lasts not for years, but even for decades, and it’s 
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very difficult to convince feudists to refuse from revenging.”88  As of September 2010 the 
special commission reported that 56 families were currently in the state of blood feud 
with 40 cases pending consideration.  The same source credits the former Chechen 
president for the improvement of the state of blood feuds, “starting from 2002, due to the 
efforts of Ahmat-Hadji Kadyrov, the previous President of Chechnya, 349 blood feudists 
have been reconciled.”89  While it is difficult to confirm or refute such statements, the 
mere fact that a commission has been formed to specially deal with the problem of blood 
feuds in Chechnya is a huge step in the right direction. 
 
 The former President’s son and current President Ramzan Kadyrov, has also put 
his own twist on blood feuds in Chechnya.  He has repeatedly stated that if a militant kills 
a law enforcement officer, a blood feud will cover all of the militant’s relatives.  On the 
other hand, the families of killed members of the armed separatist insurgency have no 
right to openly announce blood feud on any kind of law enforcement90.  It is in cases such 
as these that one sees a blood feud transform into terrorism. 
 
A Very High Profile Feud 
 Along side the typical blood feuds of the highlands, there have been some very 
high profile vendettas in recent years.  The most famous feud occurring after a seemingly 
innocuous traffic meeting ended in gunfire.  On 14 April 2008 the motorcade of the 
current Chechen president, Ramzan Kadyrov, ran into a convoy carrying a member of the 
Yamadayev clan in Gudermes.  When Yamadayev refused to move his care for the 
President’s motorcade, a firefight ensued.  Later, Yamadayevs started getting killed.  First 
was Ruslan Yamadayev, a decorated military commander and former member of the 
Russian Duma.  On 24 September 2008 he was shot ten times at an intersection in the 
center of Moscow.  Six months later, his brother Sulim was shot in a parking garage in 
Dubai on 30 March 2009.  Sulim was a Hero of Russia, the highest award in the country, 
and former head of Vostok battalion.  An attempt was made on Isa, the third brother, in 
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July 2009, but the assassin failed and was sentenced to 8 ½ years in jail.  The hitman told 
authorities that Kadyrov had ordered the hit, but the president has adamantly denied the 
accusation.  Isa Yamadayev has remained defiant in true Chechen style: “even if we’re all 
killed, we are a big clan.  Our deaths will not go unpunished.”91  But many of the details 
are still unknown and situation quite complex.  
 
 Before he was killed, Sulim Yamadayev conveyed his belief that Kadyrov was 
not behind his brother’s murder, but rather those who wished to create a clash between 
his family and the president.  He also emphasized the seriousness of the blood feud: 
“Such murders are very dangerous in Chechnya, and Ramzan knows it.  And I think 
many people knew that recently we have had a conflict with Kadyrov. And those people 
have killed Ruslan to cause a clash between me and Ramzan Kadyrov.”  Sulim also 
insisted he had not declared a blood feud on anyone as blood revenge is “a very serious 
matter,” and rejected any media accounts that he had said otherwise.92  Yamadayev 
originally fought on the side of the separatists in the First Chechen War, but then fought 
with Russian federal forces in the Second Chechen war. He then headed the Vostok 
battalion, a special military unit that takes orders directly from Russia’s General Staff and 
is considered to be one of Chechnya’s most efficient military units.93   
 
 For quite some time the Yamadayev family has been in conflict with president 
Kadyrov.  The Yamadayevs are a strong and powerful clan, easily a threat to Kadyrov’s 
consolidation of power.  The president accused the commanders of the elite Vostok unit, 
including Sulim himself, of being involved in killings and abductions in Chechnya.  And 
in May 2008, he was removed from his duties as battalion leader and that summer was 
put on a wanted list by Chechen prosecutors.94  He also accused Sulim of involvement in 
the assassination of his father, Akhmad Kadyrov, the first elected president of Chechnya 
following the second war, saying he had “70% proof.”  Kadyrov even went so far as to 
say he believed the Yamadayevs were actively plotting to poison him.  Nevertheless,  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some time after these accusations, Sulim was shot dead in Dubai.  Dubai police chief 
Dhahi Khalfan Tamim said after the killing, “The Chechens have taken their grievances 
outside Chechnya. They are killing each other abroad. As a federative state, Russia hold 
full moral and state responsibility for allowing these criminals and killers to solve their 
disputes on our land.”95  Tamim’s statement is quite illuminating, and marks how a blood 
feud, real or imagined, set in a time of modern warfare can also change with the times. 
 
 After Sulim’s death, his brother Isa continued to posit that Sulim never threatened 
the president or announced a blood feud.  An Investigatory Committee at the Prosecutor’s 
Office of the Russian Federation came to similar conclusions; there were not enough 
facts to prove Sulim threatened Kadyrov’s life.  Although, earlier Isa had stated that his 
brother Sulim intended to announce the blood feud to Kadyrov via telephone, but the 
information never reached the president.  Strangely enough, for months after Sulim’s 
death, Isa and a fourth brother, Musa continued to proclaim that Sulim was in fact alive 
and only awaiting a complex surgery.96  Isa later accepted his brother’s death and then 
went on to accuse Kadyrov and Adam Delimkhanov, Duma deputy and close Kadyrov 
ally, of organizing Sulim’s murder.   
 
 Whether a true blood feud was declared or not, it is obvious the two parties were 
in conflict and finally came to a reconciliation on 25 August 2010 with the presence of 
Kadyrov and Delimkhanov at Sulim Yamadayev’s commemoration ceremony, or tezet.  
Local observers believe their presence at the Yamadayev house in Gudermes for the 
mourning ceremony signals the final reconciliation of the conflict.  According to one 
local expert, “If we remember that Isa Yamadayev had accused Ramzan Kadyrov and 
Adam Delimkhanov of organizing his brothers’ murders, the fact that they were admitted 
to the tezet means that they were pardoned. That is, it is refusal from blood feud against 
Kadyrov and Delimkhanov.”97  According to Kadyrov, he went to the reconciliation 
exclusively under the request of “respectful people” after the elders had emphasized that 
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Isa Yamadayev had apologized for earlier statements implicating the president in his 
brothers’ deaths.  “I visited the mourning ceremony and expressed my condolences; I also 
visited Sulim’s mother, who was very touched,” said Kadyrov.98  The president also told 
reporters, “I forgave Isa Yamadayev for his incorrect statements. He lost two brothers. I 
feel bad for him.”99  The fact that both Kadyrov and Delimkhanov were both admitted to 
the tezet convinces some observers that this is the final reconciliation.  But one observer 
did note that while Isa received the condolences, he did not shave his beard, which means 
he was not going to refuse from revenging his brothers’ killers.100  It is hard to tell what 
the true motives of either party are in this case.  Only time will tell. 
 
 And there remain many unanswered questions for some.  Is the Yamadayev clan 
simply plotting a trap for Kadyrov? Have they abandoned their sense of honor?  Was the 
reconciliation forcefully orchestrated by Moscow?  These questions remain unanswered, 
but Kadyrov did succeed in pacifying his long time rivals.  Now that the Yamadayevs 
have seemingly bowed down to Kadyrov, there are no more significant opposition figures 
in Chechnya. Now all are loyal to Kadyrov.  The Yamadayev clan ran the only battalions 
that were independent of the president’s rule, and they disbanded in spring 2008.  This is 
yet another piece of the big plan to force all of the Chechen clans into line behind 
Kadyrov.  In the past few years, the violent separatist insurgency has been pushed our of 
Chechnya into its neighboring republics, due in large part to Kadyrov’s tactics, which 
many say include widespread torture and summary executions.101  Kadyrov has the full 
backing of the Kremlin and this does not seem likely to change because he has proved 
himself the only man who can maintain order in Chechnya. 
 
 Whether or not these killings are a result of a traditional Chechen blood feud 
remains to be seen, but the impact is still great.  While these are particularly 
extraordinary circumstances because they involve the current president of Chechnya and 
his ongoing struggle to secure all state power and authority in Chechnya, these murders  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perfectly illustrate how the practice of blood feud can be used for political motives and as 
a weapon of war.  So powerful is the concept of blood feud that it can be used to 
consolidate power to run a republic.  The power blood feud has in the general population 
must not be forgotten.  Many have died in Chechnya over the past two decades, and 
whatever the exact cause of death, most relatives would point to the two wars fought by 
Russian federal forces as the root cause.  The violent death of a family member often 
changes a person’s attitude; especially one with such strong family ties as it is in 
Chechnya.  The dead all have family members — brothers, sisters, children — who 
would now be more willing to exact revenge for their loved ones. 
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PART II: THE ROAD TO WAR 
 
CHAPTER 4: A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHECHNYA 
  
 What is important about the history of Chechnya is how great an impact it has on 
Chechen identity and the Chechen mentality itself.  In her book about her travels in the 
Caucasus after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Suzanne Goldenberg emphasizes the 
import and precariousness of history: “History is a dangerous thing in the Caucasus.  
Disasters, betrayals, or rare moments of stability remain close to the surface no matter 
how remote in time. At the beginning of nearly every interview, I would be interrupted 
and admonished: ‘First you must understand our history.’ Inevitably, the account that 
followed would be at offs with the version I had just heard.”102  
 
 It is understandable that there are competing histories in the Caucasus.  It is a 
region where different worlds and cultures collide; where outside rulers try to assert their 
dominance; an isolated society where ancient customs have thrived; and a land where its 
people have always had a fierce thirst for freedom and an unbridled willingness to lay 
down their lives for independence.  It is these aspects of Chechen history, which shape 
Chechen identity and set the background for the modern conflict. 
 
The Borderlands 
 For centuries the Caucasus have been on the threshold between the Christian and 
Muslim worlds: the gateway between Europe and Asia.  In ancient times, the Caucasus 
mountain range was a natural barrier, with the northern Eurasian steppes on one side and 
the more advanced civilizations of southern Mesopotamia and Anatolia on the other.  In 
the more near past, the region’s location on the edges of empires has caused the peoples 
of the Caucasus to be swept up in the struggles of competing powers.103  After 1556, 
various powers surrounding the North Caucasus began vying for power over the region:  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the Ottoman empire and the Crimean khanate to the west, the Shanybanis of Turkestan to 
the east, Muscovy and the Great Nogay Horde to the north, and Iran to the south.104  
Often the dividing line of empires would run right through the middle of the Caucasus; its 
position on the periphery making the region that much more fiercely contested and more 
exposed to attack.105 
   
 By the late 18th century, Russia had begun its systematic offensive against the 
North Caucasus. And although the peoples of the North Caucasus were not united 
socially or linguistically, it would be many years until the region was firmly under the 
grip of the Russian empire.106  During this period of struggle between Imperial Russia 
and the native clans and tribes, the North Caucasus was truly the frontier between two 
worlds. To the north was the Russian empire, heir to the modernizing vision of Peter the 
Great, reaching south to tame and cultivate the peoples, those primitive highlanders, 
between the Black and Caspian Seas.107  The continuous onslaught of outside forces 
attempting the rule of the peoples of the North Caucasus has made the Chechens a fierce 
people.  They have been fighting for freedom for centuries, and will continue to do so.  
The people would also remain fiercely independent, loyal to their own traditional culture 
and customs, and unwilling to accept cultivation from foreign empires. 
 
 The beauty and danger of this place has drawn many travelers, intellectuals, and 
artists over the centuries.  In the 19th century, the Caucasus drew the likes of Lermontov, 
Tolstoy, and Pushkin.  But there are a constant two sides that enticed people; a sense of 
awe and terror that drew people in.  The region as homeland to both nobles and savages: 
proud highlanders who bravely fought against the onslaught of foreign empires, or 
backward mountaineers whose “propensity for violence was matched only by their 
cultural chauvinism.”108  This dichotomy of the North Caucasus is still alive today.  
Fascination and danger for the contemporary traveler lay in the political struggles,  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banditry, rivalries, ethnic violence, and nationalist uprisings.  The beauty of the 
Caucasus, of course, remains and echoes the words of Robert Ker Porter from 1817, “I 
know not who could behold the Caucasus and not feel the spirit of its sublime solitudes 
awing his soul.”109 
 
An Isolated Society in the Caucasian Mountains 
 
 “Nature’s bulwark, between the nations of Europe and of Asia.” 
- Robert Ker Porter, 1817 
 
 Geography itself is the greatest reason for the isolation of many of the different 
peoples and cultures of North Caucasus, and Chechnya is no different.  Twenty-five 
million years ago, the two great landmasses of Europe and Asia crashed together with 
such force that the “longest and loftiest of all mountain ranges” was formed.110 The 
Caucasus Mountains have kept the tribes and clans of highlands cut off from many of the 
developing societies surrounding them, and up until the middle of the 16th century, the 
North Caucasus remained isolated from the international arena.  During this time of 
isolation, the peoples of the North Caucasus even remained isolated from one another.  
The various clannish societies spread through the region professed different regions: the 
western tribes were mostly Christian, the eastern tribes predominately Muslim, and the 
tribes in the center (the Chechen and Ingush) still retained many of their pagan roots.111  
Even after the North Caucasus became the center of a great game played by all the 
surrounding powers, many of the peoples, including the Vainakh, remained impervious to 
outside influence.  The land may have technically changed hands between various 
empires, but many clans, especially those in the Caucasus Mountains persisted in self-
governance and retained their traditional culture. 
 
 Although the natural conditions of the mountains were quite harsh, they also 
provided the means of living and survival for the highlanders of Chechnya, mainly  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pasture for cattle grazing.  The mountaineers would have to constantly be on guard to 
protect their mountain villages, auls, and cattle from outside tribes and the mountains 
would serve as a natural defense against invaders.  The auls were used as permanent 
defense and usually well armed and fortified.  The objective of the fortified auls was to 
protect the land, property and lives of the villagers by standing together.  When the 
villagers worked together and even several auls joined forces, the resistance of foreign 
attackers could last for weeks. The Chechens consider the mountains as shelter, a refuge 
where they feel truly safe.  This reality of life in the highlands has also come to define 
much of the Chechen mentality that each day is a struggle for survival.112 
 
 The mountains have served not just as a safe haven to the people, but also to the 
culture of Chechnya.  The mountainous terrain made it easier for the people to resist 
Imperial rule and thus preserve traditional culture.  This has lead to what is now an 
obvious distinction between highlanders and those from the lowlands.   Living in the 
mountains has had a fundamental influence on the mentality of many of the Chechen 
people, and has kept teip society and traditional culture alive in some of the Chechen 
population. 
 
The Rise of Russian Rule and the Defeat of Imam Shamil 
 
 “The Caucasus may be likened to a mighty fortress, marvelously strong by nature, 
artificially protected by military works, and defended by a numerous garrison.” 
- General A. A. Veliaminov, 1828 
 
 The Russian quest to conquer the North Caucasus began in the late 18th century, 
and ruthlessly continued into the next century, using genocidal tactics to subdue the 
Caucasian peoples.  In 1824 began the era of the gazavat, or the holy wars.  The most 
well-known and perhaps impressive holy war was the Great Gazavat of Imam Shamil 
from 1834 to 1859.  His followers were called murids, members of a Sufi Islam order, but 
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also holding on to the old traditions of the highland clannish societies.113   These Sufi 
orders, in particular the Naqshbandi, informal and populist in nature, where the best 
equipped to hold influence and provide the structure and leadership needed to rebel 
against imperialism.114  The native peoples of the North Caucasus resisted Russian 
encroachment with guerilla warfare, culminating in Shamil’s war that only ended with his 
surrender in 1859. The conquest of the North Caucasus was finally completed with the 
defeat of the Circassians in 1864.115  It was much more than a military conquest, but also 
a frontier process to try and assimilate the peoples to the south into the Russian Empire. 
While Tsarist Russia could claim to have control of the lands of the North Caucasus up 
until the revolution, they could never claim control over all of the people.  
 
 By 1813 Russia had asserted its right to the North Caucasus over the other 
powerful empires of the time, but recognized the need to more fully conquer the peoples 
of the region.  As appointed governor and chief administrator of Georgia and the 
Caucasus, General A. P. Ermolov said in 1816, “The existence of independent or semi-
independent states or communities of any description, whether Christian, Musulman, or 
Pagan, in the mountains or in the plain, was incompatible with the dignity and the honour 
of his Master [the Russian Tsar], the safety and welfare of his subjects.”116  To fully 
incorporate the North Caucasus into the Russian Empire, Ermolov applied the ‘siege 
policy’ and waged continuous military campaigns against those who resisted the Russian 
advance. He also enacted policies to attempt to reorganize societies to better capitulate to 
Russian rule.  His drastic measures greatly disrupted the traditional way of life, and the 
people of the North Caucasus coordinated many armed rebellions.  These uprisings were 
brutally put down by Ermolov through terror on a massive scale where executions of 
entire villages were used for the fault of just one or a few of its people.117  His techniques 
of malicious destruction of property, mass deportation, and indiscriminate killing were all 
done in the name of bringing “true freedom and enlightenment to backward tribal  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peoples.”118  Ermolov was the quintessential frontier conqueror and Tsarists, Bolsheviks, 
and the Russian generals of the 21st century would use his ruthless methods.119 
 
 It was in the mid 19th century that Islam emerged as the only dominant political 
force able to cross tribal or ethnic divides and unite the peoples of the North Caucasus in 
their anti-colonial efforts.  It was a Chechen, Imam Mansour, who first advocated a pan-
Caucasian military and political alliance in the late 18th century to combat Russian 
colonization of the North Caucasus.  It was appropriate that he was Chechen because the 
Chechen were exposed to Russian policies later than other peoples, and thus quick to 
react to the challenge.  Their readiness to mount resistance was intensified by the absence 
of ruling elites or princely dynasties that could be influenced and manipulated by the 
Russians.  Mansour could not ignite in the Chechens and mountain Dagestanis the 
strength needed to overcome the Russians because some were still reluctant to join 
military campaigns outside their own locality.120  His battles against the Russian forces 
would also establish a pattern that would last for over 200 years: the Russians send in 
large forces and raze Chechen villages while the Chechens retreat to the dense forests and 
high mountains to rally around their leader who then announces a holy war to expel the 
Russians; under his leadership, Chechens then kill Russian soldiers through well-planned 
and well-executed guerilla attacks.121   Mansour’s ideas would also remain in the 
collective memory of the people, and when these ideas met the institutional power of Sufi 
organization and a strong leader, a new wave of resistance would develop.122  It would 
actually be a Dagestani who would later unite the Chechens and wage the best-fought 
campaign against the Russian Empire. 
 
 In autumn of 1834, after the murder of the previous Imam, Shamil was 
proclaimed as the third — and last — Imam of the Caucasian Imamate.  Although his 
first two years as leader were spent consolidating his authority among the old forces and  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defeating local rivals, he was the imam capable of garnering the most widespread support 
in Dagestan and Chechnya.123  Shamil initially sought reconciliation with the Russians, 
but they would not accept his conditions, mainly the continued practice of sharia law.  
Russia also did not trust Shamil, so instead of negotiating any kind of peace deal they 
Empire offered only the option of unconditional surrender, either voluntary or by force.   
Shamil of course refused this surrender and thus started another long Russian march 
through the North Caucasus.  It was devastating to the local populations, but convinced 
many of the people to support Shamil, sustaining his insurgency for nearly thirty years.  
He lead a brilliant guerilla war against the Russian Empire for decades,124 and although 
he preached the conservative brand of Naqshbandi Islam and advocated sharia law over 
local customary law, he was still able to draw support from the highlands where the 
people were typically less religious and more militant.125  Shamil’s imamate included the 
many different ethnic groups of the Northeast Caucasus.  In 1859, Shamil was finally 
captured by Russian forces, which then set upon the Northwest Caucasus with a 
vengeance.126  Even after the North Caucasus fell firmly under Imperial rule, his gazavat 
against the Empire served an even great purpose.  He had proved that a small group of 
guerillas, if they fought hard enough and believed hard enough in their cause, they could 
take on the Great Russian Empire.127  This legacy would go on to inspire many boys from 
the North Caucasus to take up the mantle of Shamil and take on the Russians.  In fact, 
one of his namesakes born in 1965 would grow up to eclipse the original Shamil’s 
notoriety among Chechens. 
 
 Even after Russian forces had incorporated the North Caucasus firmly into the 
Empire, they will still unable to fully control the local populations and impose the 
imperial system.  “The North Caucasus remained relatively untouched by imperial rule 
before 1917, a sensitive and rebellious frontier region with cultural links to worlds 
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beyond the borders of the Russian Empire.”128  The bloody and protracted struggle of 
many of the mountain societies against Russian rule led regime officials to proceed 
cautiously in the region. This created conditions that distanced these peoples from the 
Russian system.  Chechen and Dagestani mountaineers did not serve in the Imperial army 
and instead paid a three-ruble-per-person tax in exchange for their exemption.  Even after 
the onset of World War I when the army became desperate, the regime was simply unable 
to compel highlanders to serve.  The Chechen mountaineers were also not in Imperial 
schools,129 leaving all aspects of child rearing and education up to the individual teips.  
Romanov rule over the Empire was a “patchwork of disparate territories, brought 
together in largely piecemeal fashion.”130  This incomplete nature of Russia’s conquest of 
the North Caucasus and the unsatisfactory nature of integration left traditional culture to 
thrive in the mountains of Chechnya.   
 
 The Caucasus War of the mid 19th century though Russian officials much about 
the dangers of Russian influence in the North Caucasus.  Any attempts to administer 
mountain regions according to Russian laws only intensified mountaineer opposition to 
the Russian presence.  Russian practices forms of rule were often inappropriate for the 
peoples of the borderlands, who preferred the ancient tribal forms of administration and 
justice.  Instead, Imperial officials experimented with codifying customary law, adat, in 
the courts, and resolving conflict according to local traditions, especially in Chechnya.131  
There remained a great strength of many of the national feelings in the Caucasus, 
especially in Chechnya, despite the bloody wars and savagery of both sides over the 
years. Languages and traditions were jealously guarded regardless of the attempts at 
Russification and secularization, which were at their most zealous in the North Caucasus.  
The basic fabric of society remained largely intact.132 
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Under Soviet Rule 
 Russian’s weak rule in the North Caucasus “crossed the divide of revolution,” as 
Sufi orders grew during Soviet rule.  In 1925, 70-80% of Chechen men over eighteen had 
some kind of connection to a Sufi brotherhood.  Sufi-led fighting continued in the 
mountains of the North Caucasus until 1947.133  The Soviets not only objected with the 
influence of Islam in the region, but also saw the traditional customs of the people as 
backwardness, directly in opposition to the Soviet Universalist ideology of progress.  In 
1927, Soviet officials declared sharia and adat as unacceptable guides to the 
administration of justice, but still were unable to actually control or even monitor such 
evens in the North Caucasus.134  Other customs, such as nokhchalla, were outlawed in 
Chechnya.  While these practices were officially banned by the state, they by no means 
died out. 
 
 Some Bolsheviks even identified with the Chechen people because they saw 
ethnic minorities along with the working class as victims of the Imperial regime.  But 
what the Soviets did not realize was that Chechens would not welcome their rule that 
would bring them out of their mountaineer backwardness; the Chechens preferred their 
ancient customs and traditions and had no intentions of being brought into the 20th 
century.   
 
 The Soviets dealt the North Caucasians another great injustice, one that would 
prove to be a powerful symbol during later national revivals, Stalin’s deportations.  This 
is a wholesale persecution that is still very much a part of the living memory of the 
Chechen people.  On 23 February 1944, Red Army day, 200,000 Chechens and 90,000 
Ingush were deported from their homelands to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, along with 
several other ethnic minorities from the Caucasus.  Although they were taken completely 
by surprise, some Chechens managed to escape into the mountains where outlaw gangs 
remained up until 1951.  The official line was that the deportations were necessary for 
wartime security, or suspected Nazi collaboration, or simply the “unreliableness” of  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Caucasians, but Stalin’s ulterior motives are obvious.  The Chechens were the most 
numerous and rebellious nation, making their deportation an attempt at destroying natural 
leadership in the region.135 
 
 The consequences of the deportations were severe for many in the North 
Caucasus.  Not only were people forcibly removed from their homes, but also entire 
histories were rewritten.  The names of towns and villages were changed, territories were 
wiped off the map, other territories given over to other republics, and the Karachai and 
Balkar peoples officially ceased to exist.  The stigma on the deported peoples also 
followed them home after they were finally allowed to return. It was only after Stalin’s 
death and Khrushchev’s Secret Speech denouncing him in 1956 that the beginnings of 
reparation were made to the deported peoples.  In February 1957, a law was passed 
restoring the territories of Checheno-Ingushetia, Karachai-Cherkess, and Kabardino-
Balkar.136 
 
 The North Caucasus remained through the Soviet period one of the least Russified 
regions of the USSR.  Fewer Russians settled in the Caucasus than any other part of the 
Soviet Union,137 and the spread of secularism and education did little to weaken clan 
affiliations and clan culture.  The Chechens especially held on to their strong national 
feelings and their distinct customs.  The collapse of the Soviet Union would prove to be 
the perfect time for a revival of traditional culture and a new kind of nationalism. 
 
Chechnya: Breakaway Republic 
 
“He turned his back oh his native borders 
And flew off to a far-away land, 
Alongside the merry ghost of freedom.” 
- Aleksandr Pushkin, Captive of the Caucasus, 1822  
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During the rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and exactly one month after 
he is elected President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, General Dzhokhar Dudayev 
declared independence from Russia on 27 November 1991.  He did so in the wake of the 
many constituent republics that declared independence from the USSR after the failed 
coup attempt.  Dudayev was also quick to call for a return to the traditional culture, 
including adat that had been suppressed by the Soviets.  By this time the Russian 
Federation had also declared its independence from the Soviet Union with Boris Yeltsin 
as its president.  Yeltsin was unwilling to accept Chechen self-determination and 
immediately declared a state of emergency in the republic, sending troops to Grozny, the 
capital.  But the new president quickly backed down when he saw violence would be 
opposed by still Soviet President Gorbachev and fellow new President Dudayev.138  
However this reluctance towards violence on Yeltsin’s part quickly vanished and in 
December 1994 Russian Federal forces began bombing Grozny and then fully invaded 
Chechnya in what would become the First Chechen War. 
 
 By August 1996, Russian troops were forced out of Grozny, but Dudayev did not 
live to see their retreat.  Zelimkhan Yandarbiev and then Aslan Maskhadov had already 
replaced him when this single military act convinced Yeltsin to seek a political 
settlement.  The settlement and cease-fire did not bring so much peace as simply an 
absence of war.  The two years of war had radicalized an entire generation of young 
Chechens, intensified the cleavages within the Chechen leadership, and proven that 
violence could provide a livelihood.139   After the first war, the Islamic element of the 
struggle became more pronounced, although the foreign Islamist presence was never as 
prominent as was often claimed or depicted in the Chechen conflict. 
 
 Reciprocal assassinations became commonplace, as well as continuous violence 
and kidnappings.  Within a few short years the spiral of violence in Chechnya had spun 
into a second war when Russian Federal troops again invaded Chechnya in October 1999  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headed by new president Vladimir Putin.140  The Second Chechen War would prove to be 
even more brutal than the first on the parts of both the federal forces and the separatists.  
This time around, some of the former separatists had defeated over to the federal side in 
favor of official pro-Kremlin Chechen government, such as the Yamadayev clan.  The 
separatists too had changed their game plan; the Islamist faction was growing and their 
tactics changing.  Under the leadership of Shamil Basayev, terrorist methods would 
replace the more traditional guerilla tactics of the first war, such as the 2002 Moscow 
Theater bombing, the 2004 Beslan school siege, and numerous suicide bombings. 
 
 Russian forces killed Basayev on 10 July 2006 and Doku Umarov took up 
leadership of the separatist movement.  By this time the Russian campaign in Chechnya 
was less like a traditional war and more like a counter-terrorist operation.  Umarov had 
also elevated the separatist movement further into the Islamist realm and declared a rebel 
United Caucasian Emirate, with himself at the head. Meanwhile, former rebel Ramzan 
Kadyrov becomes president of Chechnya in 2007 and consolidates his power with the 
backing of the Kremlin as being to only man who can control Chechnya.  The actual 
“end” to the Second War is disputed because of the ever changing tactics and morphing 
conflict that has pushed most of the rebel forces out of Chechnya and into neighboring 
republics. 
 
 Kadyrov declares an end to Chechen counter-insurgency operations in March 
2009, and then President Medvedev officially declares an end to the Russian counter-
terrorism operations in Chechnya on 27 March 2009.  The real tragedy of this long-
running war in Chechnya is not that there was no one to speak for the people, in fact there 
were probably too many, but that those who took up the mantle, whether they be in 
Moscow, Grozny, or the highlands, preferred a pyrrhic victory over a long lasting 
peace.141 
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CHAPTER 5: CHECHEN IDENTITY 
 It has already been discussed what it means to have true Chechen character, but 
what does it mean to be Chechen?  How do the Chechens see themselves? For centuries 
clannish society provided all the identity the people of Chechnya wanted and needed.  In 
the modern era, it is necessary for nations; especially those seeking their own nation-
state, to have a cohesive identity of what it means to belong to that nationality.  Since the 
fall of the Soviet Union the Chechen people have had to cultivate their own sense of 
identity.  They have created the Chechen identity using collective memory and in turn 
creating nationalism that can sustain the separatist movement. 
 
Collective Memory 
 In war and conflict, the collective memory of a people, what they see as their own 
shared history, is just as important and perhaps more so than the actual history.  How a 
people perceive their past is going to be the same way they perceive their future.  
Russia’s efforts to conquer the North Caucasus and then subjugate the peoples of those 
lands into first the Imperial regime and then the Socialist regime, are the events that most 
shape the collective memory of the Chechen people.  The biggest mistake of the Russian 
regimes was that while they conquered the lands of Chechnya, they never conquered the 
people.  Instead, the independent spirit of the Chechens and their strong thirst for freedom 
never died, but simmered for over a hundred years.  The Russians did not rule the 
Chechens through total devastation and destruction, but rather left the people to their own 
devices.   As Niccolo Machiavelli wrote in his evocative work The Prince, 
  
For, in truth, there is no sure of holding other than by destroying, and whoever 
becomes master of a City accustomed to live in freedom and does not destroy it, 
may reckon on being destroyed by it.  For if it should rebel, it can always screen 
itself under the name of liberty and its ancient laws, which no length of time, nor 
any benefits conferred will ever cause it to forget; and do what you will, and take 
what care you may, unless the inhabitants be scattered and dispersed, this name, 
and the old order of things, will never cease to be remembered, but will at once be 
turned against you whenever misfortune overtakes you…142  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This passage perfectly illustrates the experience of Chechnya.  Machiavelli suggests that 
an invading regime must break the will of the people it means to rule if it would rule 
them successfully.  If their will is not broken, then the history and spirit of the people will 
live on, and the attempts at colonization and subjugation never forgotten.  In fact, these 
events will forever be embedded into the memory of the people.  It is these past 
grievances by the Russians that have had such a strong impact on the collective memory 
of the people of Chechnya and been a unifying element and battle cry for the Chechen 
separatists. 
 
 The brutality of General Ermolov’s campaigns to conquer Chechnya, which 
would be the blueprint for subsequent attempts at quelling the rise of the Chechen nation, 
still live on in the Chechen mind to such an extent that resistance to Russian rule has 
become a vital part of Chechen identity.   Ermolov did take a page from Machiavelli’s 
playbook and tried to fully subordinate the Chechen people by any means necessary.  His 
attempts at the full destruction and devastation of Chechnya were drastic and greatly 
disrupted the traditional way of life in the region, and the people staged numerous armed 
rebellions that were brutally put down.  Because Ermolov was convinced that “gentleness 
in the eyes of the Asiatics was a sign of weakness,”143 he saw terror as the only method 
appropriate for the Chechens.  He also claimed he “desire[d] that the terror of my name 
should guard our frontiers more patently than chains of fortresses, that my word should 
be for the natives a law more inevitable than death.”144  Although Ermolov’s tactics were 
extremely harsh, they were not enough to fully break the Chechen people.  Instead, it is 
figures like he and the experience of his policies that has stuck in the Chechen mentality.  
These experiences have ingrained a sense of rebellion and resistance towards Russia in 
the Chechen identity.  For centuries the Chechen people have seen their relationship with 
Russia as us versus them.  In many societies this kind of mentality can create powerful 
group cohesion and solidarity, and Chechnya is no different. 
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  Alongside this feature of resistance in the Chechen identity is the celebration of 
Chechen heroes like Sheikh Mansour and Imam Shamil.  These figures are strong 
symbols for the Chechen people that can also produce cohesion and solidarity among the 
people.   Sheikh Mansour led the first organized uprising of mountaineers and declared a 
gazavat against the Russian “infidels” under the banner of Islam.  He consolidated 
Chechens, Dagestanis, Circassians, Kabardians, and Adygeans to protect their homelands 
from the Russian invaders.  Mansour successfully recruited thousands of men for his 
campaigns against the Empire’s advance into the North Caucasus, mostly Chechens and 
Dagestanis, who fought bravely for several years against Imperial forces until his capture 
in 1791.145  While Mansour inspired many people, he lacked the kind of support needed 
to stage a resistance strong enough to defeat Russian forces.  Sheikh Mansour is an 
especially important figure for the Chechens because he was the first such resistance 
leader, a Chechen himself, and the main influence for the military-Islamic state of the 
more famous and more successful Imam Shamil. 
 
 Imam Shamil would prove to be one of most powerful symbols used by the 
Chechens to promote their cause for independence.  One of the most advantageous 
features of collective memory is that it can be selective.  Shamil’s image evoked strong 
feelings among many Chechens, as his imamate was regarded as symbolic of the desire 
for national independence across the North Caucasus.  But this was a form of idealized 
version of reality;146 the accurate history of Shamil’s fight against the Russians in the mid 
19th century was quite different from the fight for independence being waged in the 
1990s.  The Chechen leaders of the day “self-consciously resurrected the memory of 
Mansour and Shamil,”147 regardless of the appropriateness of the comparison.  Shamil 
and his memory would inspire many of the warlords that came out of the Chechen wars.  
The most famous, Shamil Basayev, would relish his connection to his namesake and the 
imagery it could stir up among the people.  While the beginning of the Chechen separatist 
movement did not very well match the struggles of Mansour and Shamil, the subsequent 
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leaders of the movement would eventually evolve themselves to better match the Islamic 
quest for freedom. 
 
 Joseph Stalin picked up on Machiavelli’s method where Ermolov left off.  He 
sought to solve the “Chechen problem” and break the people by scattering them from 
their homeland in the deportations of 1944.  This was devastating to the some 300,000 
Chechens who were uprooted from their lives.  The deportation was not only an attack on 
the religion of the Chechens, but also their way of life.  Removing so many Chechens 
from their villages greatly disrupted clannish society and it’s structure.  But in many 
cases, because they were so far away from home, the teip ties among the people grew 
even stronger.  While this period of exile increased the importance of clan relationships, 
it also inspired a new sect of Islam in Chechen society: Wahhabism.  The Wahhabis were 
fundamentalists and openly hostile to the traditional Sufi sects, who incorporated pre-
Muslim Chechen traditions and promoted a moderation of faith.148  But the 
overwhelming majority of Chechens were not converted to this form of Islam that 
promoted the need to purify the current Islam.  Stalin’s plan was also short-lived, and by 
the mid-1950s, many Chechens along with other nationalities were being repatriated back 
to their homelands.  But the damage was done; the deportations were another feature of 
the attempted Imperial and Soviet destruction of the Chechen people. 
 
 This history of exile under the Soviets is a true part of the Chechens’ living 
history.  The deportation plays such a powerful role as grievance in collective memory 
because it so recently happened.  Many of those affected are still alive today.  In a 2003 
interview to Oregon Public Broadcasting in the segment Bridging World History, 
Ramzan Magomedov explains what it means to be Chechen and emphasizes the 
deportation as told by his grandmother as one of the defining features.  Magomedov 
recalls her story: 
 
It was cold, it was really cold outside and there was a knock at the door. My 
grandmother opened the door and there was an officer and two soldiers who told 
her that she had fifteen minutes to gather whatever she can — whatever she can  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carry.  And take her child and be on that truck that is sitting out there, one of the 
trucks that was in the village, and they’ll be taken to the city, and they are being 
deported — as they said — to Siberia.  Of course, in actuality it was to 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, but to Chechens it really didn’t make any difference 
at all. It was still deportation, a forceful deportation to a faraway land that they 
had no affiliation with at all.  When my grandmother talked about it, I don’t 
remember a single time when she didn’t cry. Every time, even many, many years 
later, brought tremendous pain to her to remember those events. 
 
One can see how easily these stories of deportation, and there are tens of thousands of 
them just the same, can have an impact of the identity of an entire nation and play a 
major role in that nation’s quest for independence.  In the construction of a collective 
identity, historical memories are especially important.  These memories will go on to 
serve a greater role than even the experience of current clashes with an adversary. 
 
Nationalism 
 For centuries the Vainakh people have fought against foreign invaders and their 
influence for the right to live their lives as their own and in their own way with their 
distinctive customs and traditions.  In the modern context this fight has shifted somewhat.  
No longer is it just a fight to be free, but one of self-determination: the right of a people 
to live in a state that is their own.  To create a nation-state, the people need to 
development a sense of nationalism.  In Chechen society this was not so easy. For 
hundreds of years, a Chechen’s primary identity came from his village and membership 
in his teip.  While collective responsibility was a important aspect of life, the Chechens 
have always remained a very independent-minded people with their own language, 
culture, and territory, but no centralized authority.  The Chechen people have managed to 
bring many of the ancient customs into modern times, creating a distinctive culture to 
help define themselves as a people.  The Chechens also already had their own land and 
language necessary for self-determination, but still more was needed to connect the clans 
of Chechnya as one nation. A new national identity more important than teip identity was 
needed to create nationalism convincing enough to require independence. 
 
 This concept of self-determination is a tricky one.  Emerging from Woodrow 
Wilson after World War I, it centers on the idea that every people (nationality) has the 
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right to their own state.  For self-determination to work, the people in question must be a 
true nation with particular defining characteristics.  Valerii Tishkov pointedly points out 
that “the rhetoric of self-determination has always been basically an emotional political 
argument to justify disintegration and violent conflict.”149  Regardless of the legitimacy 
of self-determination, any one would argue after declaring independence and then 
fighting two wars over said independence, like Chechnya has done, strong nationalism is 
needed.  The best way for the Chechens to do this is simply to promote their radical 
cultural distinctiveness from Russia and use collective memory to create internal 
solidarity in the fight for an independent state.  Again it is necessary to label the Russians 
as the aggressors who have oppressed the Chechen people for centuries.  Despite any 
differences between the many clans of Chechnya, there are still those features of society 
that bring them together, especially their collective history of resistance against Russia. 
 
 Interestingly, an instrumental factor in the emergence of the Chechen nationalist 
movement was the structural legacy of Soviet nationality policy and its principle of 
ethnoterritorial federalism, despite the actual repression of any national aspirations.  The 
existence of these “tactical nation-states” cultivated the development of national elites 
and cultures, however unintentional.150  Negative historical experiences with Russia in 
combination that particular Soviet policy would help to consolidate and reinforce group 
identity and solidarity among many Chechens, culminating with that declaration of 
independence in 1991.  It was that rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union that created 
the space for the ideological and political liberalization of the Chechen nationalist 
movement.151  The movement would grow and evolve over the next twenty years, most 
notoriously taking on an Islamist aspect. 
 
 Dudayev would also play a critical role in increasing Chechen nationalism by 
emphasizing Vainakh culture: an identity that reached across clan ties.  After declaring 
independence of the still Checheno-Ingush Republic in 1991, he proclaimed, “There is a 
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single and indivisible Vainakh people with a place of honor for each of its five member-
nationalities: Chechen, Ingush, Orstkhoy, Melkhistin, and Akkin.  Today, history gives us 
a unique chance to establish that fact by creating a single Vainakh statehood.”152  His 
statement reflects a larger idea to incorporate as many historic communities as possible in 
the Chechen entity in order to widen its geographic span and deepen its cultural legacy.  
While Tishkov aptly points out that having spent a majority of his life outside Chechnya 
Dudayev was less than experienced to be able to extrapolate on Chechen nationalism.  
Nevertheless, his sentiments were not so off the mark.  As Tishkov’s informant 
explained, “In the past, those groups (Orstkhoy, Melkhistin, Akkin) may have rated as 
separate teips, but they can scarcely be described as present-day nationalities.  In 1988-
94, they gained much stronger standing among the Chechens.”153  Incorporating these 
groups into the Chechen nationalist movement would help to bolster it and reaffirm the 
overarching qualities that join Chechens together: their Vainakhness. 
  
The Rise of Islamic Nationalism 
 Throughout most of the 20th century, the rise of nationalism was the biggest 
concern for political scientists, especially in the aftermath of two world wars born out of 
nationalism.  When multi-ethnic socialist unions like Yugoslavia and the USSR collapsed 
in the beginning of the 1990s, it appeared nationalism would continue to be on the rise, 
with so many ethnicities stirring for independence.  But another movement was on the 
rise nearing the end of the 20th century that surprised many scholars: the religious political 
movement.  Religious extremists hijacked the Iranian revolution in 1979; the religious 
right was becoming more prominent in US politics during the 1980s; and September 11th 
brought the Islamist jihad movement into the international sphere.  Indeed there was a 
worldwide rise of religious fundamentalism, and Chechnya was not immune.154  The first 
Chechen conflict in the 1990s was one of an organized group of separatists fighting for 
independence from Russia.  While Islam is a part a Chechen identity, the fight was still a 
secular one.  The majority of Chechen rebels had yet to be Islamized. 
                                                        
152 As quoted by Tishkov, pg. 50 
153 Tishkov, pg. 50 
154 Fox, pg. 717 
  
58 
58 
 The Second Chechen War was much less organized on the side of the separatists, 
but the biggest difference was the role Islam was to play in the fight.  Many of the rebel 
leaders had become Islamized and their tactics changed drastically.  There was also the 
introduction of some foreign fighters into the conflict, specifically Wahhabis.  While 
fundamental Islam became a new quality of the conflict, that is not who the Chechens 
really are. The media and the rebels themselves exaggerate the extent of which foreign 
mujahideens participate in the conflict, and the fact that fundamental Islam is a part of 
Chechen society, it is not.  Approximately 80% of Chechens disagree with Wahhabism or 
any kind of fundamental Islam.155 Most people still identity with traditional culture and 
teip society, especially in the mountains.   The current Chechen government has not 
helped the Islamic image of Chechnya.  President Kadyrov has enacted sharia laws, or 
attempted to, that promote conservative and fundamental Islamic ideals that are not 
congruent with the true nature of the majority of the Chechen people.   
 
 Most Chechens, especially those in the mountains, still identity much more with 
teip society and traditional culture than with fundamental Islam.  While many are 
practicing Muslims, that is only one aspect of their identity, not their entire identity, as 
the features of Islamic fundamentalism would suggest.  Traditional culture still plays a 
major role in the modern Chechen identity.  And as such, traditional culture has also had 
its own impact on the violence in Chechnya. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
155 Politkovskaya, pg. 336 
  
59 
59 
CHAPTER 6: CONFLICT 
 
 Both of the wars in Chechen in the recent past were a struggle for independence 
on one side and the fight to preserve the Russian Federation on the other.  On the side of 
the separatists, the second war was dominated by the rise of the Islamist faction.  
Although less organized than they were in the first war, the later rebels would in fact 
cause more destruction and devastation in Chechnya and across Russia.  The Islamist 
factor in the Chechen conflict played a major role in changing the nature of the conflict 
and has thus overshadowed many of the other causes of violence in Chechnya, one of 
these being traditional culture and the impact it has had on the Chechen mentality and its 
views towards violence and vengeance. 
 
The First Chechen War 
 
“The war is over.  The resistance put up  
by the bandits and separatists has been crushed.” 
- Boris Yeltsin, 28 May 1996 
 
 During the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Chechnya followed the 
example of other nations within the union, and although it was not a constituent republic, 
and issued a unilateral declaration of independence from the USSR.  Chechnya’s intense 
and bloody past with Russia, constituted by entrenched historical grievances and the 
shared experience of deportation,156 made the republic especially poised to seize the 
unique opportunity at that time.  The new president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, also 
inadvertently motivated the declaration of independence by encouraging local elites to 
“take all the sovereignty you can swallow” in his fight against Gorbachev and Soviet 
central authority.157  It was a quick road to war after Chechnya first asserted its right to 
independence, as the new Russian Federation was unwilling to see another part of it go.  
While the collapse of the USSR had been liberating at first, it was also a painful loss of  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empire for the Russians, after which fears were heightened that the Russian Federation 
itself might disintegrate.158  The new regime did not want Chechnya to set a precedent for 
other nationalities within the Federation to break away. 
 
 Russia’s erratic response following Chechnya’s declaration and the failed first 
attempt at intervention only served to consolidate support behind Dudayev.  Several 
factors contributed to Moscow’s decision to invade Chechnya after two years of inaction.  
Again this fear that Chechnya might inspire other republics to secede from the Russian 
Federation was palpable.  There was also the presence of a significant ethnic Russian 
population within Chechnya, around 100,000.159  This would later become a staple of 
Russia’s foreign policy: the protection of Russian citizens in the “near abroad.”  Support 
for intervention also grew within the Kremlin because of economic interests, mainly oil, 
in Chechnya and the belief that a “short and victorious war” would improve President 
Yeltsin’s ratings.  After the expiration of an ultimatum for Dudayev to surrender on 9 
December 1994, Yeltsin authorized the use of “all means available” to disarm “illegal 
groups” and impose constitutional rule in the republic.  Two days later the Russian army 
and interior ministry forces that had amassed along the Chechen border, crossed into 
Chechnya from three directions, about 35,000 ground troops.160 
 
 The first attempt for federal forces to take Grozny on New Year’s Eve was a 
catastrophic failure.  Russian forces in terms of manpower and equipment were far 
superior to that of the Chechens, but their hubris in the belief that the Chechens would 
easily surrender lead to a humiliating defeat where as many as 2,000 Russians soldiers 
died.161  Violence escalated due to the widespread and unanticipated Chechen resistance.  
The Russian troops, already demoralized and severely ill prepared, found themselves 
confronted with guerilla warfare around every corner.  In time they came to see virtually 
the entire civilian population as the enemy.162  Federal forces finally took the city through  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massive air and artillery bombardment, which ended with many civilian casualties.  By 
December 1995 losses from the conflict were estimated to be somewhere between 26,000 
and 50,000, including approximately 20,000 civilians.163 
   
 There were many reasons, political and military, for the Russians’ poor 
implementation of the war.  Most important to the repercussions after the war was the 
actual state of the Russian troops.  In many cases they were poorly trained and sent into 
battle with wildly inaccurate intelligence.  There was also an extreme lack of discipline 
among the often frightened and brutalized Russian troops. This led to frequent reprisals 
against the civilian population, including the massacre of over 100 Chechens in the 
village of Samashki in April of 1995.  The Russians also established ‘filtration’ center to 
help distinguish combatants from non-combatants.  These too were a travesty against the 
Chechen people.  Many detainees were tortured or summarily executed; thousands are 
believed to have died in captivity.164  This is yet another shared experience to be filed 
away in the collective memory of the Chechens.  This experience gave the people more 
grievances against Russia fueling the fires of resentment and increasing support for the 
rebels. 
 
 By May 1995 the situation of the rebels had deteriorated greatly as manpower, 
ammunition and medical supplies died out.  In an attempt to reverse the situation we see 
the rise of Shamil Basayev.  Acting without authorization from the Chechen leadership, 
he and his band of rebels mount an attack on the southern Russian town of Budennovsk, 
seize a hospital and take some 2,500 hostages.  This led to an agreed cease-fire and direct 
peace talks with Moscow after their bungled attempt to storm the building.  While 
negotiations that summer made progress, the peace process was brought to an end after a 
series of bomb attacks on Russian officials in Chechnya.165  This is a method Basayev 
would become famous for utilizing, and the Russian forces perhaps more famous for their 
regular mismanagement of these situations. 
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 Fighting resumed through the Moscow backed Chechen elections, where the 
Kremlin’s man, former Communist leader Doku Zavgayev, won a large majority, albeit 
after a widespread boycott of the vote.  In January 1996 the rebels carried out another 
hostage raid, which ended with another ill-advised Russian assault that further damaged 
the leadership in Moscow.  After this second debacle and in anticipation of the 
presidential elections, Yeltsin proceeded with renewed fervor to seek a cease-fire that 
preserved the Russian Federation.  The turning point came when Dudayev was killed by a 
Russian air strike in April 1996.  His successor, Yandarbiev, then travelled to Moscow to 
negotiate an agreement, signed 27 May 1996.166   Needless to day, Yeltsin’s “victory” in 
Chechnya won him re-election but the declaration was premature because the cease-fire 
did not bring peace as violations continued.  By August the rebels were in almost full 
control of Grozny.  Peace did not seem imminent as the Russian forces had been through 
a war of attrition, and morale was very low.  Yeltsin also desired the re-capturing of 
Grozny in addition to the withdrawal of federal forces, an impossible task. 
 
 The peace agreement was finally agreed to on 27 August 1996 in Khasavyurt, 
Dagestan, which brought an end to the fighting and was ambiguous enough to appease 
both sides.  After the Russians realized it was futile to attempt to retake Grozny and more 
liberal elements had more sway in the Kremlin, it was Yeltsin’s national security 
supremo, General Aleksandr Lebed, who pushed the negotiations through.  He was the 
man who recognized that the war was both unwinnable and wrong for the Russians who 
could not restore constitutional order in Chechnya through air strikes and artillery 
shelling.  He also made the negotiations with the Chechen leadership possible by his 
sensitivity to the psychology of the Chechen side.167  The peace settlement also had a 
five-year postponement of the decision about the final status of Chechnya, and in the 
meantime the republic would remain in the federation, but with an autonomous 
government and fresh elections.  The approximate total number of casualties from the 
first conflict was between 60,000-100,000 dead and 240,000 wounded.  Aslan  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Maskhadov, former chief of staff and architect of the peace agreement, would win the 
1997 Chechen presidential election,168 but Chechnya would not last the five years until 
the second conflict broke out. 
 
 The First Chechen War lasted less than two years, but its impact was great.  The 
physical destruction of Chechnya was devastating - entire sections completely wiped out; 
however it was the impact the war had on the Chechen people and their mentality that 
was most detrimental.  The handling of the conflict by the Russian forces only bolstered 
the separatist cause and even helped to pave the way for a new addition to the cause: 
fundamental Islam. It was only after the first war that parts of society, albeit it small 
parts, began to be radicalized by Islamic fundamentalism.  And as so much has already 
been written on this subject, religious fervor changed the nature of the conflict and the 
nature of the battle. 
 
The Second Chechen War 
 
“When people disappear from their families and no one will say  
where they are located, and then their relatives find their bodies,  
this gives birth to a minimum of ten new rebels.”  
- Akhmed Kadyrov 
 
The First Chechen War left Chechnya broken, and little was done, or could be 
done, to repair it following the end of the conflict.  The hopes for a new political 
consensus and progress towards rebuilding that were brought by the peace settlement 
were premature.  Promised aid from Russia’s federal budget never came.  Widespread 
lawlessness, organized crime, and persistent political fragmentation kept Chechnya in 
chaos.  Kidnappings, torture and murder were not uncommon; Maskhadov simply could 
not consolidate power and keep the republic in control.  Following the first war, several 
factions of power emerged in Chechnya.  The main force was Maskhadov, but two field 
commanders occupied local strongholds with growing independence from the Chechen  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government: Shamil Basayev and Salman Raduyev.169  Over time Basayev would 
become the most powerful warlord in Chechnya, with the help of Maskhadov’s 
incapabilities and the rise of fundamental Islam. 
 
 It would be Islam’s role in the movement that would ultimately undermine 
Maskhadov completely.  He and his followers remained a secular separatist movement.  
He attempted to ban Wahhabism, but many of those fighters had made an alliance with 
Basayev with the new goal of driving the Russians out of the entire North Caucasus and 
establishing an Islamic republic.  Despite condemnation from Maskhadov, Basayev and 
his rebels began a campaign of attacks on military and police installations in neighboring 
Dagestan, and by August 1999 it was a major incursion of around two thousand militia 
fighters into Dagestan.  In response Russian forces were dispatched to put down the rebel 
forces.  Not finding the support for insurrection they had hoped, Basayev and his rebels 
were forced back into Chechnya.170  Maskhadov had failed to achieve the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of force and clearly lost control of the effective rebel forces inside 
Chechnya. 
 
  The devastating Moscow apartment block bomb attacks in late August and early 
September 1999 added a new dimension to the crisis in Chechnya.  Although the origin 
of the attacks would turn out to be quite controversial, newly appointed Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin blamed Chechen and Wahhabi terrorists for the attacks171.  The Russian 
response was considerably larger in scope than the 1994 invasion: over 90,000 federal 
forces from multiple branches advanced rapidly through northern Chechnya.  The initial 
aim of the Russian forces was to destroy terrorist bases, but this was soon expanded to 
include the creation of a “security zone,” and later the intention seemed all along to 
establish full control over the whole of Chechnya.172  Maskhadov called for the 
fragmented militia groups to unite together against the Russian threat, but to no avail, and 
the full force of the Russian military came down upon the Chechen people with the same  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disregard for civilian life as in the first conflict. 
 
 While the various rebel factions were no match for the federal forces in traditional 
warfare, rebel groups, especially those of Basayev, were still able to cause heavy Russian 
casualties with guerilla warfare and terrorist tactics.  This would only increase the 
brutality with which federal forces carried out their mission,173 a brutality that would go 
on to color the entire conflict in a severely bad light for the Russians because of their 
numerous and notorious human rights violations. Many speculate on the reasons behind 
the harshness of the federal forces.  An overzealous new president?  Undisciplined and 
ineffectual military? Or simply retribution for the humiliation of the first war?  While 
these are all probably correct reasons, along with many others, the impact is the same.  
These crises only further entrenched the idea of Russia and the Russians as the enemy in 
many of the Chechen people. 
 
 Throughout the mid 2000s the security situation in Chechnya remained 
precarious.  The rash of assassinations, large-scale ambushes, and terrorist attacks in 
2004 underscored the intractability of the conflict.174   The brutal attacks Basayev and his 
followers became known for, such the 2002 Moscow Theatre attack and the 2004 Beslan 
school attack did more harm innocent people, they alienated the ordinary Chechen.  
While Chechens are Muslim, the vast majority reject fundamentalism and deplore such 
actions.  The Islamist movement was dealt a blow when Basayev was killed by Russian 
forces in June, 2006, but Doku Umarov was prepared to take up the mantle and even 
declared a Caucasian Emirate in 2007 with himself as Emir, thus ending any kind of 
nationalist movement that could have been left for an independent Chechnya.  The 
Russian operation in Chechnya was now a decidedly counter-terrorist one, and many of 
the rebels fled to the neighboring republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan. 
 
 Putin had plans for re-establishing “legitimate” authority in Chechnya to be run 
by Chechens.  At beginning of 1999 war there were several Chechen splinter groups that  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sided with Moscow: Kadyrovs, Khakievs, Yamadayevs.  Although it was Beslan 
Gantamirov, former mayor of Grozny, who spearheaded the assault on Grozny that 
eventually gave victory to the Russians,175 Putin appointed Akhmed Kadyrov to lead the 
new Chechen administration he was constructing,176 thus “Chechenizing” the crisis in 
Chechnya. 
 
Chechenization 
 As the second conflict in Chechnya continued, Moscow prescribed a set of 
policies that would gradually hand over responsibility for the conflict in the republic over 
to the Chechens themselves.  The aim of Chechenization was to obviously relieve the 
Russian troops of some of the combat duties in Chechnya.  But this transfer of power 
from federal forces to locals one also set in motion a struggle for power within the 
republic that would take years to subside. 
 
 Akhmed Kadyrov was the first at the helm of new pro-Moscow administration in 
Chechnya.  Kadyrov, along with many others now pursuing power in Chechnya, had 
fought against Russia in the first war, but in the second preferred aligning with old 
enemies against the new Islamist opponents.177    Kadyrov’s key mission was to recruit 
and deploy pro-Moscow Chechen militia units in combat operations against any 
perceived separatists.  This was to not only show loyalty to Moscow, but also to 
consolidate power in Chechnya firmly behind the Kadyrov clan.178  The Khakievs and, of 
course, Yamadayevs still had power in Chechnya and behind them their own militias.  
Kadyrov was a ruthless tactician and as time passed convinced more and more rebels to 
switch sides.179 
 
 After Akhmed Kadyrov’s assassination in May 2004, his son Ramzan became the 
de facto leader of the pro-Kremlin administration, although he would have to wait two  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years until he reached the legal age to officially become president.  The younger Kadyrov 
proved to be even more ruthless than his father.  He publicly stated the best way to deal 
with the insurgents in the mountains and forests was through their relatives.  Ramzan and 
his men already had a reputation for unrestricted behavior, and after his father’s 
assassination and the attack in Beslan, his methods of targeting the families of rebels 
became that much harsher.180  This was not the only way in which Kadyrov applied the 
features of Chechen traditional culture, specifically collective responsibility and blood 
feud, to the conflict. 
 
 While the Kadyrovs were successful in consolidating power, their followers could 
still have problems.  The Kadyrov clan had many enemies in Chechnya; enemies in a 
state of blood feud.  Hence, it was conceivable that as long as at least one of the people 
who had declared blood feud against the Kadyrov clan was still alive, then neither he nor 
his relatives could feel completely safe.  As the militias and their combat operations 
grew, these young men in Chechnya were becoming “bound by blood” to the Kadyrov 
clan by the constant killings, torture, and humiliation that occurred during these 
operations.  This created a vicious cycle for the followers of Kadyrov where newly 
acquired enemies in blood feuds increased the insecurity and forced the men to bind 
themselves even closer to the Kadyrov clan in order to survive.181  While the former 
Kadyrov tried to mitigate this kind of violence, the younger did not.  He did not share his 
father’s cooperative spirit,182 and thus he was more successful in consolidating power, but 
with more violence.    
 
 While the Islamic factor of the nature of crisis in Chechnya receives a lot of 
attention, deserved attention, there are other factors of society that have been overlooked 
as having an impact on violence in the region.  As we have seen in the past, the 
traditional culture of Chechnya is itself quite violent.  The persistence of the ancient 
practice of blood feuds into the modern era shows how ingrained violence and vengeance  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is in the Chechen mentality.  While Islam can have a radicalizing effect on violence, so 
can the blood feud.  The events that occurred, and continue to occur, after the 
Chechenization of the conflict show just how great the impact of blood feud is on modern 
society.  Not only was power in Chechnya “Chechenized,” the violence was as well. 
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PART III: ESCALATION AND 
MOBILIZATION 
 
CHAPTER 7: RADICALIZATION 
 
While most analysis of the crisis in Chechnya focuses on Islamization and its impact 
on the radicalization of the Chechen populous, a radicalization of a different nature has 
been overlooked.  The tradition of the blood feud Chechnya has not had so much a 
radicalizing effect on the people, but on violence itself.  This radicalization has its basis 
in traditional Chechen culture, a constituting part of Chechen identity based on honor.  In 
a society where the principle of collective responsibility is applied both by the state and 
by those struggling against it, and the law of the blood feud is still practiced, conflict is 
sure to “spread like wildfire.”183    
 
Traditional Culture in Mobilization and Radicalization 
“Deep culture is the bedrock of social action.”184  In all things man does, his culture 
and mentality play a critical role.  This is especially true when it comes to social or 
political movements.  It is our beliefs, traditions, and customs that shape how we see the 
world, formulate ideas about the world, and how we react to it.  Our culture also gives us 
the tools, which we might use to do this.  The Chechen people have kept traditional 
culture and customs alive for centuries through the maintenance of their teip system of 
society.  The Chechens’ strong views on honor and freedom completely shape their 
world.  This mentality makes it easier for mobilization against a perceived wrong and 
also the radicalization of reaction. 
Clan structure has also had a huge impact on the mobilization of the Chechen people  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during the Chechen wards.  First and foremost in clannish society is an obligation to help 
one another.  There is not only an obligation to the clan itself, but also to all clan 
members.  This sense of collective responsibility is still quite strong in modern Chechen 
society.  When teip ties are strong enough, one wrong deed against one person has the 
potential to mobilize hundreds of people to take revenge.  During the wars, a great many 
wrong deeds were committed against a great many Chechens. Therefore much of the 
retaliatory violence against Russians in Chechnya is just as likely to come from the 
Chechen adherence to traditional customs than from an imported sect of fundamental 
Islam. 
At times of crisis, clan loyalties grow deeper and strong and are more likely to 
emphasize customs such as blood feud.  When action is deemed necessary, traditional 
culture can be used as a legitimizing factor for mobilization.  It is especially during 
conflict and times of crisis that people cling to the things they know best, the things they 
most believe in.  For the Chechens it is the teip, for the teip is the basis of identity.  
Membership in the clan is not fleeting. Teip is forever.  Ideologies, such as Wahhabism, 
fail, or their leaders die, or they simply lose popular support, but the clan never fades 
away.  There will always be the local factors; the traditions of Chechen culture that will 
drive armed resistance in the form of vengeance where it is needed. 
It is the mechanism of blood feud that enables people to take revenge.  The motto is 
simple: “You offend my brother (or father, son, mother, sister, grandfather, uncle, cousin) 
and I will do anything to take revenge on you, the whole of your family, and all your 
colleagues and friends.”185  What greater offense is there than taking the life of a loved 
one?  And so many Chechens have lost loved ones in the modern crisis in Chechnya.  All 
Chechens can trace these deaths back to the Russians.  Whatever the exact cause, the root 
of it can be found in the Russian invasion.  For each person that dies, he might have ten 
relatives ready to take arms up against the offenders. 
Absence of the legacy of centralized authority to apply the rule of law left justice up 
to the teips themselves.  For centuries the teips have been militarized, not just to dispense 
their own justice but also for collective defense. They had to be to protect their land,  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people, and villages from the continuous aggression by foreign forces.  These 
organizations existed along blood and territorial lines, which in turn made them much 
easier to mobilize.186  The survival of traditional culture, adat, blood feud also means the 
survival of militarized clans, and the same ease of mobilization through clannish society.  
This history of self-governance echoes today in what the West would call vigilantism, but 
to a Chechen is simply a personal carriage of justice, the only honorable way.  
Individual avengers may also join armed groups in order to fulfill personal missions.  
In other words, the behavior of armed groups is not always determined by ideology.  
Membership in an expansive clan, or in cooperation with one, is a desirable alternative to 
being a lone wolf.187  So it is very likely that for each rebel force in Chechnya there could 
be one man, if not many more, who was inspired to take arms against Russian forces not 
out of religious fanaticism, but out of a sense of person duty to avenge the honor of 
family.  Vengeance is a very powerful sentiment and motivator that can easily radicalize 
a population. 
 
In Pursuit of Revenge 
The horrors and brutalities of the Russian campaigns in Chechnya have already been 
described.  These atrocities had a big impact on the Chechen people, much like the 1944 
deportations, and their mentality.  Just as with the Caucasian wars of the mid 19th century 
and the Soviet deportations, the First and Second Chechen Wars will be implanted into 
the collective memory of the Chechen people.  But there is an even more immediate 
consequence of these wars: the retaliation of the Chechens for the acts committed against 
them by the Russians.  The traditional culture that is so ingrained in the Chechen 
mentality forces many people to pursue revenge for the action of federal forces. Russia’s 
indiscriminate bombing and shelling of Chechen towns and villages, and “dirty war” 
tactics such as kidnappings and summary executions alone would be enough to radicalize 
many people, but coupled with strong the concepts of honor and freedom found in most 
sections of Chechen society has caused a radicalization on a much larger scale.  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The long history of Russian aggression in the North Caucasus has also labeled Russia 
as permanent enemy in the minds of many Chechens.  In one of Dudayev’s more rousing 
speeches in 1990, he deemed Chechnya to be in “a constant state of war” with the 
Russia.188  This is a reflection of Chechen culture and society in how they view history.  
History is not to be forgotten.  It is deeply ingrained in the Chechen culture.  If history is 
to be relived in the memory of one man, or an entire people, and if that history is bloody 
it is relived again and again it seems only natural that a man could be radicalized by that 
memory, especially in a society where blood calls for blood. 
 
 The concept of honor and the fear of shame have been discussed at length, but its 
importance in Chechen society and to the Chechen people cannot be overemphasized.  
The Russian invasions into Chechen in the last twenty years and the subsequent actions 
of federal forces can be seen as a kind of humiliation of the Chechen people by the 
Russian government.  In traditional Chechen culture, one of the worst insults on a man is 
that of humiliation.  No true Chechen man with any kind of nokhchalla would accept 
humiliation. Retaliation is necessary, usually in the form of violent retaliation.  
 
 Public opinion still dictates the norm for how a man should act.  A man is not only 
judged by his deeds, but also by how the community sees him.  In the past, a man who 
admitted fear in public was banished from the community and lost all his friends, even 
his wife.  Chechen highlanders felt ashamed even of a deed of their great-grandfathers.  
They were also proud to tell their sons the deeds of bravery and wisdom of one of his 
ancestors, which is a clear indication of the importance of honor.  These same feelings 
persist today.  Imagine that a misdeed has occurred against the family in the present. How 
else is a good highlander to respond, except through revenge.  It is the characteristics of 
tradition culture that Forces a man to pursue revenge against Russian federal forces. 
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CHAPTER 8: POLITICIZATION AND 
IDEOLOGIZATION OF VIOLENCE 
 
“War is a continuation of politics by other means.”  Never has this famous quote by 
Carl von Clausewitz been so apt as with the Chechen experience.  Like nowhere else in 
the world, Chechnya seems to almost skip over politics completely and proceed straight 
to war.  But that by no means implies there is not politics in Chechnya violence.  In 
actuality, it is quite the opposite.  When violence is used in Chechnya it is almost always 
used as a political weapon.  It is easy to determine much of the politics of modern 
violence in Chechnya: separatists vying for independence; Islamists fighting for 
fundamentalist ideas and a religious state; Russian forces attacking to keep the federation 
alive.  Even centuries ago the violence of the blood feud had political implications and 
ramifications in Chechen society.  Does this ancient form of political violence exist in 
modern Chechnya?  Yes, of course. 
While the separatists, Islamists, and Russians attract far more attention to their 
politicized violence, the politicized violence of traditional culture should not be 
overlooked.  The fact that this political violence is harder to identify and even prove its 
existence does not diminish its importance or that role it has played in the Chechen 
conflict.  With the Russian regime in the role of invader, the Chechen violence against 
Russian forces in retaliation can be seen as an act of defense not just of lives and land, 
but also of culture and society.  Chechen revenge is not just revenge for revenge’s sake, it 
holds deep meaning.  The cultural implications are enough, but in times of extreme crisis, 
these kinds of acts of defending Chechen honor can be politicized to first justify the 
actions for others and then mobilize more of the population. 
Blood feuds were often used in the past as political means, whether it was simply 
defending the honor of one’s teip, or to increase the social standing of one’s clan.  In both 
circumstances violence was seen as necessary.  If an offense called for a blood feud, then 
it was a deserved vengeance, a righteous revenge.  In the case of the modern Chechen 
war, it is in the Chechens’ right and duty to respond to the Russians with violence. It is 
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ingrained in the Chechen character, in the concept of honor, in the code of the blood feud. 
It must be done, or risk humiliation and defeat.  It is in this way that the blood feud in the 
modern context becomes political.  Violence can be promoted as a Chechens political 
duty to avenge the offenses made by the Russian regime.  It is also a tool that can be used 
to radicalize more Chechens towards the same political violence. 
The clans of Chechnya not only give societal structure to the people, but also political 
structure.  “The social networks of teips, which had grown stronger during the period of 
Chechen exile, served as lines along which political forces could mobilize — even 
though people from the same clan might equally see themselves as mortal enemies.”189  
In the Russian forces there is the common foe that could bring even the biggest rival 
clans together.  Together violence can be used as a grievance against the Russian forces.  
Traditional Chechen culture justifies this political violence and once this violence is 
justified through political motives as well as societal ones (traditional culture, blood 
feud), violence becomes it’s own kind of ideology. 
The politicization of violence in Chechnya was not just used against outside enemies, 
but within as well.  Ramzan Kadyrov’s approach to counter-insurgency famously uses the 
characteristics of a traditional Chechen blood feud.   He is well known to target the 
family members of fighters, many times holding the relatives of insurgents as hostages 
under threat of death until the insurgent in question surrenders.190  This idea of collective 
responsibility has never vanished from Chechen society, but Kadyrov’s institutional use 
of it is a new element.  Kadyrov also used the blood feud to consolidate his power in 
Chechnya, and there is nothing more political than the consolidation of power.  The very 
famous blood feud between the Kadyrovs and the Yamadayevs was extremely political in 
nature.  The Yamadayev clan was the last thing standing in Ramzan’s way to absolute 
power in Chechnya.  Sulim Yamadayev’s famous battalion was the only one that could 
still garner support in the republic that was not under the control or influence of Kadyrov.  
Sulim’s untimely death was quite timely for Ramzan.  Although he would adamantly 
deny any involvement in Sulim’s death, or the earlier death of Ruslan Yamadayev, he  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never seemed to deny the existence of a blood feud between the two clans.  In fact, the 
blood feud was a very useful political maneuver for him.  Not only would it strike fear in 
his enemies, but also it would command obedience and loyalty from his followers.  
Kadyrov continues to use violence for political gains in Chechnya. 
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CONCLUSION  
Chechnya is a unique place on earth not only because of its geopolitical location, 
but also because of the distinctive culture that has persisted among the people for 
centuries, especially in the highland of the republic.  The isolated nature of society along 
with the maintenance of the clan structure has allowed the traditional culture and customs 
of the Vainakh people to live on into the 21st century.  The blood feud is one of these 
ancient customs that is still practiced today by the Chechens.  It is still practiced because 
honor and the fear of shame are still defining characteristics of modern Chechen man and 
society as a whole. 
 
Chechen traditional culture and blood feud bring a unique aspect to the two 
Chechen wars fought over the past twenty years.  Russian aggression did plenty by itself 
to radicalize the populace, along with the introduction of fundamental Islam, but the very 
nature of the Chechen society and the people’s mentality had its own radicalizing effect 
on Chechen violence during these conflicts with Russia.  Violence in the name of honor, 
blood feuds, still continue to this day and do indeed have an impact on radicalizing the 
population, especially within individual teips.  It is in the Chechen nature for a person to 
have the desire to avenge any offense afflicted upon him.  And because of strong clan 
loyalties, these desires and then actions can spread very quickly through entire families 
and villages. 
 
The continued violence in Chechnya even after the war has been declared “over” 
by Russia and many of the Islamist insurgents have fled to neighboring republics, 
demonstrates how there is another factor motivating violence within society.  This is the 
traditional mindset of the defense of honor that is so ingrained in the Chechen people and 
is then carried out through blood feuds. 
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ABSTRACT 
 This paper examines the impact of traditional Chechen culture, especially the 
continued practice of blood feuds, on violence in the republic.  First, an in depth 
discussion of clannish society is used to show how and why such traditional 
characteristics and ancient customs have been allowed to thrive among the Chechen 
people, especially those living in the highlands.  The focus then turns to the strong 
concept of honor that flourishes in Chechen society as the main motivator of blood feuds.  
The more detailed discussion of blood feud itself and its ancient and modern practice 
show the potential for and realization of widespread violence in Chechnya.  The 
Chechens are a people with deep historical roots and a strong collective memory.  The 
events of the past, especially conflict with Russia, greatly influence the events of the 
present and future.  The modern Chechen identity is a unique mentality, which combines 
role of teip and its strong influence on society with the rise of nationalism, and later 
Islamic nationalism.  The recent wars in Chechnya have also had a defining characteristic 
on the Chechen people and their psyche.  When this kind of crisis is combined with the 
traditional Chechen culture and a propensity for violence, the outcome can be 
devastating, especially when violence is radicalized and politicized and used as a 
mobilizing force. 
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